Implement extended armor throughout system but not turned on yet.

node/Bond.cpp

@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ void Bond::sendPATH_NEGOTIATION_REQUEST(void* tPtr, int pathIdx)
 	outp.append<int16_t>(_localUtility);
 	if (_paths[pathIdx].p->address()) {
 		Metrics::pkt_path_negotiation_request_out++;
-		outp.armor(_peer->key(), false, _peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+		outp.armor(_peer->key(), true, false, _peer->aesKeysIfSupported(), _peer->identity());
 		RR->node->putPacket(tPtr, _paths[pathIdx].p->localSocket(), _paths[pathIdx].p->address(), outp.data(), outp.size());
 		_overheadBytes += outp.size();
 	}
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ void Bond::sendQOS_MEASUREMENT(void* tPtr, int pathIdx, int64_t localSocket, con
 		// debug("sending QOS via link %s (len=%d)", pathToStr(_paths[pathIdx].p).c_str(), len);
 		outp.append(qosData, len);
 		if (atAddress) {
-			outp.armor(_peer->key(), false, _peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+			outp.armor(_peer->key(), true, false, _peer->aesKeysIfSupported(), _peer->identity());
 			RR->node->putPacket(tPtr, localSocket, atAddress, outp.data(), outp.size());
 		}
 		else {
@@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ void Bond::processBackgroundBondTasks(void* tPtr, int64_t now)
 				if ((_monitorInterval > 0) && (((now - _paths[i].p->_lastIn) >= (_paths[i].alive ? _monitorInterval : _failoverInterval)))) {
 					if ((_peer->remoteVersionProtocol() >= 5) && (! ((_peer->remoteVersionMajor() == 1) && (_peer->remoteVersionMinor() == 1) && (_peer->remoteVersionRevision() == 0)))) {
 						Packet outp(_peer->address(), RR->identity.address(), Packet::VERB_ECHO);	// ECHO (this is our bond's heartbeat)
-						outp.armor(_peer->key(), true, _peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+						outp.armor(_peer->key(), true, false, _peer->aesKeysIfSupported(), _peer->identity());
 						RR->node->expectReplyTo(outp.packetId());
 						RR->node->putPacket(tPtr, _paths[i].p->localSocket(), _paths[i].p->address(), outp.data(), outp.size());
 						_paths[i].p->_lastOut = now;

node/Credential.hpp

@@ -14,17 +14,6 @@
 #ifndef ZT_CREDENTIAL_HPP
 #define ZT_CREDENTIAL_HPP
 
-#include <string>
-#include <memory>
-#include <stdexcept>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "Constants.hpp"
-
 namespace ZeroTier {
 
 /**

node/IncomingPacket.cpp

@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,int32_t f
 		const SharedPtr<Peer> peer(RR->topology->getPeer(tPtr,sourceAddress));
 		if (peer) {
 			if (!_authenticated) {
-				if (!dearmor(peer->key(), peer->aesKeys())) {
+				if (!dearmor(peer->key(), peer->aesKeys(), RR->identity)) {
 					RR->t->incomingPacketMessageAuthenticationFailure(tPtr,_path,packetId(),sourceAddress,hops(),"invalid MAC");
 					peer->recordIncomingInvalidPacket(_path);
 					return true;
@@ -398,13 +398,13 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const bool
 
 				uint8_t key[ZT_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE];
 				if (RR->identity.agree(id,key)) {
-					if (dearmor(key, peer->aesKeysIfSupported())) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop
+					if (dearmor(key, peer->aesKeysIfSupported(), RR->identity)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop
 						RR->t->incomingPacketDroppedHELLO(tPtr,_path,pid,fromAddress,"address collision");
 						Packet outp(id.address(),RR->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
 						outp.append((uint8_t)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
 						outp.append((uint64_t)pid);
 						outp.append((uint8_t)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
-						outp.armor(key,true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+						outp.armor(key,true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 						Metrics::pkt_error_out++;
 						Metrics::pkt_error_identity_collision_out++;
 						_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const bool
 			} else {
 				// Identity is the same as the one we already have -- check packet integrity
 
-				if (!dearmor(peer->key(), peer->aesKeysIfSupported())) {
+				if (!dearmor(peer->key(), peer->aesKeysIfSupported(), RR->identity)) {
 					RR->t->incomingPacketMessageAuthenticationFailure(tPtr,_path,pid,fromAddress,hops(),"invalid MAC");
 					return true;
 				}
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const bool
 
 		// Check packet integrity and MAC (this is faster than locallyValidate() so do it first to filter out total crap)
 		SharedPtr<Peer> newPeer(new Peer(RR,RR->identity,id));
-		if (!dearmor(newPeer->key(), newPeer->aesKeysIfSupported())) {
+		if (!dearmor(newPeer->key(), newPeer->aesKeysIfSupported(), RR->identity)) {
 			RR->t->incomingPacketMessageAuthenticationFailure(tPtr,_path,pid,fromAddress,hops(),"invalid MAC");
 			return true;
 		}
@@ -510,38 +510,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const bool
 	outp.append((unsigned char)ZEROTIER_ONE_VERSION_MAJOR);
 	outp.append((unsigned char)ZEROTIER_ONE_VERSION_MINOR);
 	outp.append((uint16_t)ZEROTIER_ONE_VERSION_REVISION);
-
-	if (protoVersion >= 5) {
-		_path->address().serialize(outp);
-	} else {
-		/* LEGACY COMPATIBILITY HACK:
-		 *
-		 * For a while now (since 1.0.3), ZeroTier has recognized changes in
-		 * its network environment empirically by examining its external network
-		 * address as reported by trusted peers. In versions prior to 1.1.0
-		 * (protocol version < 5), they did this by saving a snapshot of this
-		 * information (in SelfAwareness.hpp) keyed by reporting device ID and
-		 * address type.
-		 *
-		 * This causes problems when clustering is combined with symmetric NAT.
-		 * Symmetric NAT remaps ports, so different endpoints in a cluster will
-		 * report back different exterior addresses. Since the old code keys
-		 * this by device ID and not sending physical address and compares the
-		 * entire address including port, it constantly thinks its external
-		 * surface is changing and resets connections when talking to a cluster.
-		 *
-		 * In new code we key by sending physical address and device and we also
-		 * take the more conservative position of only interpreting changes in
-		 * IP address (neglecting port) as a change in network topology that
-		 * necessitates a reset. But we can make older clients work here by
-		 * nulling out the port field. Since this info is only used for empirical
-		 * detection of link changes, it doesn't break anything else.
-		 */
-		InetAddress tmpa(_path->address());
-		tmpa.setPort(0);
-		tmpa.serialize(outp);
-	}
-
+	_path->address().serialize(outp);
 	const unsigned int worldUpdateSizeAt = outp.size();
 	outp.addSize(2); // make room for 16-bit size field
 	if ((planetWorldId)&&(RR->topology->planetWorldTimestamp() > planetWorldTimestamp)&&(planetWorldId == RR->topology->planetWorldId())) {
@@ -562,7 +531,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const bool
 	}
 	outp.setAt<uint16_t>(worldUpdateSizeAt,(uint16_t)(outp.size() - (worldUpdateSizeAt + 2)));
 
-	outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+	outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 	peer->recordOutgoingPacket(_path,outp.packetId(),outp.payloadLength(),outp.verb(),ZT_QOS_NO_FLOW,now);
 	Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
 	_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),now);
@@ -724,7 +693,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doWHOIS(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Shar
 
 	if (count > 0) {
 		Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
-		outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+		outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),RR->identity);
 		_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
 	}
 
@@ -952,7 +921,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doEXT_FRAME(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const
 			outp.append((uint64_t)packetId());
 			outp.append((uint64_t)nwid);
 			const int64_t now = RR->node->now();
-			outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+			outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 			peer->recordOutgoingPacket(_path,outp.packetId(),outp.payloadLength(),outp.verb(),ZT_QOS_NO_FLOW,now);
 			Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
 			_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
@@ -981,7 +950,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doECHO(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Share
 	if (size() > ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD) {
 		outp.append(reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(data()) + ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD,size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_PAYLOAD);
 	}
-	outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+	outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 	peer->recordOutgoingPacket(_path,outp.packetId(),outp.payloadLength(),outp.verb(),ZT_QOS_NO_FLOW,now);
 	Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
 	_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
@@ -1177,7 +1146,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void
 		outp.append(requestPacketId);
 		outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
 		outp.append(nwid);
-		outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+		outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 		Metrics::pkt_error_out++;
 		Metrics::pkt_error_unsupported_op_out++;
 		_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
@@ -1201,7 +1170,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doNETWORK_CONFIG(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,c
 			outp.append((uint64_t)network->id());
 			outp.append((uint64_t)configUpdateId);
 			const int64_t now = RR->node->now();
-			outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+			outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 			peer->recordOutgoingPacket(_path,outp.packetId(),outp.payloadLength(),outp.verb(),ZT_QOS_NO_FLOW,now);
 			Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
 			_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
@@ -1244,7 +1213,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_GATHER(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr
 		outp.append((uint32_t)mg.adi());
 		const unsigned int gatheredLocally = RR->mc->gather(peer->address(),nwid,mg,outp,gatherLimit);
 		if (gatheredLocally > 0) {
-			outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+			outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 			peer->recordOutgoingPacket(_path,outp.packetId(),outp.payloadLength(),outp.verb(),ZT_QOS_NO_FLOW,now);
 			Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
 			_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),now);
@@ -1348,7 +1317,7 @@ bool IncomingPacket::_doMULTICAST_FRAME(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,
 			outp.append((unsigned char)0x02); // flag 0x02 = contains gather results
 			if (RR->mc->gather(peer->address(),nwid,to,outp,gatherLimit)) {
 				const int64_t now = RR->node->now();
-				outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+				outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 				peer->recordOutgoingPacket(_path,outp.packetId(),outp.payloadLength(),outp.verb(),ZT_QOS_NO_FLOW,now);
 				Metrics::pkt_ok_out++;
 				_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());
@@ -1490,7 +1459,7 @@ void IncomingPacket::_sendErrorNeedCredentials(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void
 	outp.append(packetId());
 	outp.append((uint8_t)Packet::ERROR_NEED_MEMBERSHIP_CERTIFICATE);
 	outp.append(nwid);
-	outp.armor(peer->key(),true,peer->aesKeysIfSupported());
+	outp.armor(peer->key(),true,false,peer->aesKeysIfSupported(),peer->identity());
 	Metrics::pkt_error_out++;
 	Metrics::pkt_error_need_membership_cert_out++;
 	_path->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),RR->node->now());

node/Multicaster.cpp

@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ void Multicaster::send(
 					if (!network->config().disableCompression()) {
 						outp.compress();
 					}
-					outp.armor(bestMulticastReplicator->key(),true,bestMulticastReplicator->aesKeysIfSupported());
+					outp.armor(bestMulticastReplicator->key(),true,false,bestMulticastReplicator->aesKeysIfSupported(),bestMulticastReplicator->identity());
 					Metrics::pkt_multicast_frame_out++;
 					bestMulticastReplicatorPath->send(RR,tPtr,outp.data(),outp.size(),now);
 					return;

node/Packet.cpp

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 
 #include "Packet.hpp"
+#include "ECC.hpp"
 
 #if defined(ZT_USE_X64_ASM_SALSA2012) && defined(ZT_ARCH_X64)
 #include "../ext/x64-salsa2012-asm/salsa2012.h"
@@ -1009,8 +1010,7 @@ void Packet::armor(const void *key,bool encryptPayload,bool extendedArmor,const
 {
     uint8_t *const data = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(unsafeData());
 
-    if (extendedArmor) {
-    }
+    this->setExtendedArmor(extendedArmor);
 
     if ((aesKeys) && (encryptPayload)) {
         setCipher(ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__AES_GMAC_SIV);
@@ -1042,44 +1042,82 @@ void Packet::armor(const void *key,bool encryptPayload,bool extendedArmor,const
         if (ZT_HAS_FAST_CRYPTO()) {
             const unsigned int payloadLen = (encryptPayload) ? (size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB) : 0;
             uint64_t keyStream[(ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH + 64 + 8) / 8];
+            uint64_t mac[2];
+
             ZT_FAST_SINGLE_PASS_SALSA2012(keyStream,payloadLen + 64,(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV),mangledKey);
             Salsa20::memxor(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(keyStream + 8),payloadLen);
-            uint64_t mac[2];
             Poly1305::compute(mac,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB,keyStream);
+
 #ifdef ZT_NO_TYPE_PUNNING
             memcpy(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,mac,8);
 #else
             (*reinterpret_cast<uint64_t *>(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC)) = mac[0];
 #endif
         } else {
-            Salsa20 s20(mangledKey,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV);
-
             uint64_t macKey[4];
+            uint64_t mac[2];
+
+            Salsa20 s20(mangledKey,data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_IV);
             s20.crypt12(ZERO_KEY,macKey,sizeof(macKey));
 
             uint8_t *const payload = data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
             const unsigned int payloadLen = size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
             if (encryptPayload) {
                 s20.crypt12(payload,payload,payloadLen);
             }
-            uint64_t mac[2];
 
             Poly1305::compute(mac,payload,payloadLen,macKey);
             memcpy(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC,mac,8);
         }
     }
+
+    if (extendedArmor) {
+        ECC::Pair ephemeralKeyPair = ECC::generate();
+        uint8_t ephemeralSymmetric[32];
+        ECC::agree(ephemeralKeyPair, identity.publicKey(), ephemeralSymmetric, 32);
+
+        AES cipher(ephemeralSymmetric);
+        AES::CTR aesCtr(cipher);
+        aesCtr.init(data, 0, data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START);
+        aesCtr.crypt(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START, size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START);
+
+        this->append(ephemeralKeyPair.pub.data, ZT_ECC_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+    }
 }
 
 bool Packet::dearmor(const void *key,const AES aesKeys[2],const Identity &identity)
 {
     uint8_t *const data = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(unsafeData());
+
+    if (extendedArmor()) {
+        if (size() < ZT_ECC_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        uint8_t ephemeralSymmetric[32];
+        ECC::Public ephemeralKey;
+        memcpy(ephemeralKey.data, data + (size() - ZT_ECC_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN), ZT_ECC_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+        ECC::agree(identity.privateKeyPair(), ephemeralKey, ephemeralSymmetric, 32);
+
+        AES cipher(ephemeralSymmetric);
+        AES::CTR aesCtr(cipher);
+        aesCtr.init(data, 0, data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START);
+        aesCtr.crypt(data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START, size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_EXTENDED_ARMOR_START);
+
+        this->setSize(size() - ZT_ECC_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
+
+        /* Note: both the MAC and the data were encrypted with the ephemeral key. We don't need
+         * a separate MAC for the ephemeral encryption because the MAC check below is obviously
+         * going to fail if the ephemeral key was incorrect. */
+    }
+
     const unsigned int payloadLen = size() - ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
     unsigned char *const payload = data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_VERB;
     const unsigned int cs = cipher();
 
     if (cs == ZT_PROTO_CIPHER_SUITE__AES_GMAC_SIV) {
         if (aesKeys) {
             uint64_t tag[2];
+
 #ifdef ZT_NO_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
             Utils::copy<8>(tag, data);
             Utils::copy<8>(tag + 1, data + ZT_PACKET_IDX_MAC);

node/Packet.hpp

@@ -1182,6 +1182,25 @@ class Packet : public Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>
         }
     }
 
+    /**
+     * @return True if packet is encrypted with an extra ephemeral key
+     */
+    inline bool extendedArmor() const { return (((unsigned char)(*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] & ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR) != 0); }
+
+    /**
+     * Set this packet's extended armor flag
+     *
+     * @param f Extended armor flag value
+     */
+    inline void setExtendedArmor(bool f)
+    {
+        if (f) {
+            (*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] |= (char)ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR;
+        } else {
+            (*this)[ZT_PACKET_IDX_FLAGS] &= (char)(~ZT_PROTO_FLAG_EXTENDED_ARMOR);
+        }
+    }
+
     /**
      * @return True if compressed (result only valid if unencrypted)
      */
@@ -1287,6 +1306,8 @@ class Packet : public Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>
      *
      * @param key 32-byte key
      * @param encryptPayload If true, encrypt packet payload, else just MAC
+     * @param extendedArmor Use an ephemeral key to encrypt payload (for encrypted HELLO)
+     * @param identity Identity of packet recipient/destination
      * @param aesKeys If non-NULL these are the two keys for AES-GMAC-SIV
      */
     void armor(const void *key,bool encryptPayload,bool extendedArmor,const AES aesKeys[2],const Identity &identity);
@@ -1300,6 +1321,7 @@ class Packet : public Buffer<ZT_PROTO_MAX_PACKET_LENGTH>
      *
      * @param key 32-byte key
      * @param aesKeys If non-NULL these are the two keys for AES-GMAC-SIV
+     * @param identity Receiver's identity (must include secret)
      * @return False if packet is invalid or failed MAC authenticity check
      */
     bool dearmor(const void *key,const AES aesKeys[2],const Identity &identity);