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RFC: RBAC Support for PD #62

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150 changes: 150 additions & 0 deletions text/2020-12-16-pd-rbac.md
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# RBAC Support for PD

## Summary

Here we propose adding RBAC to PD so that all requests to PD must be authenticated,
and clients may only do actions they are explicitly authorized to perform.

This RFC is a partial implementation of [tikv/8621](https://github.com/tikv/tikv/issues/8621)
that describes a way to support RBAC-based data access control for TiKV and PD.

## Motivation

PD server exposes its APIs to the network via HTTP or gRPC endpoints.
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are there any guidelines about when to use HTTP and gRPC?


Currently, clients knowing the PD address have full access to PD APIs.
This poses a threat to the PD and TiKV cluster.

If a PD server is exposed or a client is compromised, an attacker may freely
read the status of the PD cluster and perform destructive actions.

And in some cases, we may want to authorize a client (most likely some utility)
access to a subset of PD APIs, which can’t be realized without an auth system.

Once RBAC support is added into PD, we may assign specific permissions to a client,
and make sure no client may perform actions beyond its need, minimizing the potential
outcome of a security breach.

Utilities requiring direct access to PD may gain limited access to it with a user
created earlier by an administrator.

## Detailed design

### Authentication

- PD stores `User`s in a KV database (etcd).
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Will this require an etcd access on every request? That seems like it could be a big performance hit (though I am just guessing).

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I believe an in-memory cache can mitigate the performance regression.

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could you write this optimization and the cache maintenance mechanism to the RFC?

- Username: string
- Hash: string (sha256)
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I assume this is the hash of the password? In which case sha256 is inappropriate. You should either salt the password and use multiple iterations of sha512, or use a hash algorithm specifically designed for passwords, e.g., Argon2d.

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I'm worried about the potential performance penalty if we use key derivation algorithms.

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That is a feature, not a bug - being able to hash the password quickly is a security risk. I think a token based scheme would be more performant?

- Roles: a set of strings (role names)
- A client (TiDB/TiKV/pd-ctl/…) must provide a pair of username and password to
gain access to PD APIs (including HTTP and gRPC endpoints).
- Clients using HTTP APIs should send requests with a basic authentication header.
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Can users always use https to contact PD? Using http for this would be insecure.

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That's a good idea! We may enforce TLS when authentication is enabled.

- Clients using gRPC should set its username and password in the meta field.
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Likewise, do we always use TLS for gRPC?

- What resources the client may have access to and what actions it may perform
depends on the roles that are authorized to this user, which is covered in the
following section.
- Users can be created, modified or deleted by an existing user with admin access
(also covered in the next section). An initial admin user can be pre-defined
in the config file.
- The whole authentication and authorization mechanism can be enabled by setting
the `authentication` option to `true` in the config file or command-line arguments.
Once activated, requests without a valid pair of username and password will be
rejected.

### Authorization

- First, we define `Permission` to represent a specific operation.
- Resource (eg. Stores, Regions, …)
- Action (one of GET, CREATE, UPDATE, DELETE)
- Then we map every API handler to a `Permission`.For example, `GET` `/api/v1/operators`
maps to `Permission{resource: "Operators", action: GET}`.
- `Role` is stored in a KV database (etcd).
- Name: string
- Permissions: a set of `Permission`s
- Whether a user has access to an API is determined by its roles, and permissions
included in each role. When validating a request, we generate a `Permission` by
the requested API, and check if any role of this user has it.
- There’s a special role called `Admin` that grants access to administrative APIs
of RBAC control. The initial admin user defined in the config file is assigned
with this role automatically.

### Modifications

- Implement `RBACManager` to handle user & role related CRUD operations.
- Query users & roles in memory cache.
- Load them from KV.
- Persist them into KV.
- Validate user hash & permission.
- Add administrative APIs
- GET /user
- Query user info of current request.
- `{"user": "blabla", "roles": ["reader", …]}`
- GET /users
- List all usernames and their roles.
- POST /users
- Create a new user.
- `{"username": "blabla", "roles": []}`
- GET /users/`<user>`
- Query user info
- `{"username": "blabla", "roles": ["reader", …]}`
- POST /users/`<user>`/password
- Edit user password.
- `{"password": "blabla"}`
- POST /users/`<user>`/roles
- Set user roles.
- `{"roles": ["reader", "writer", …]}`
- POST /users/`<user>`/roles/add
- Add a role to user.
- `{"role": "admin"}`
- DELETE /users/`<user>`/roles
- Delete a role from user.
- `{"role": "admin"}`
- GET /roles
- List all usernames and their roles.
- `[{"name": "reader", "permissions": [{"resource": "Operators", "action": "GET"},…]},…]`
- POST /roles
- Create a new role.
- `{"name": "writer", "permissions": [{"resource": "Operators", "action": "UPDATE"},…]}`
- GET /roles/`<role>`
- Query role info
- `{"name": "reader", "permissions": [{"resource": "Operators", "action": "GET"},…]}`
- POST /roles/`<role>`
- Set role permissions.
- `{"permissions": […]}`
- POST /roles/`<role>`/add
- Add a permission to role.
- `{"permission": {...}}`
- DELETE /roles/`<role>`
- Delete a permission from role.
- `{"permission": {...}}`
- Add middlewares to HTTP router and gRPC handlers
- Rejects any request without a valid pair of username & password.
- Maps requested handler to a `Permission`.
- Rejects the request if the current user doesn’t have the required permission.
- Modify pd-ctl, TiKV and TiDB to send requests with user credentials.

### How Clients Interact with PD

- The administrator deploys PD cluster and creates initial users with TiDB/TiKV
specific permissions (there are pre-defined roles for TiDB and TiKV).
- TiDB/TiKV may access PD with these users.
- pd-ctl and other utils may access PD with the admin user or any existing user.
Logging with an unprivileged user may restrict actions these tools may perform.

## Alternatives

### Certificate & Token-based PD Auth

This method is mentioned in [rfcs/46](https://github.com/tikv/rfcs/pull/46).
This implementation is great generally, but it lacks the ability to have fine-grained
control on PD APIs.

The idea of authenticating with certificates and its design of tokens is great though.
We may combine it with the design proposed with this RFC in the future by making
minor modifications to the administrative APIs and data models, and implementing
a token issuing and refreshing mechanism.

## Future Additions

- Token-based authentication.
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token-based authorization is considerably more secure than using username/password and IMO should be the only mechanism supported. There are fairly standard approaches which can be used, e.g., OAuth

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Maybe different users will have different security models? I'm thinking about providing several auth methods, including password-based, token-based, and certificate-based ones.

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From a security perspective, the more auth methods there are, the less secure your system is. Could we support a single, token-based auth method and provide token generation from username/password in the client?

- Compatible with [rfcs/46](https://github.com/tikv/rfcs/pull/46).