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Get front end tests passing #299
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Still need to test none of these changes have caused any bugs, also need to sort the typecheck. |
WalkthroughThe pull request introduces a series of modifications across various Vue components and CSS files. Key updates include new styles for the Changes
Possibly related PRs
Suggested reviewers
Security Recommendations
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🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
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Caution
Inline review comments failed to post. This is likely due to GitHub's limits when posting large numbers of comments.
Actionable comments posted: 9
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (7)
frontend/components/global/Markdown.vue (1)
27-28
: Security considerations for v-html usageWhile the ESLint disable comment is necessary here, the implementation is secure because:
- Input is sanitized through DOMPurify before rendering
- The class scope is properly limited to 'markdown'
However, consider adding a comment explaining the security measures in place:
- <!-- eslint-disable-next-line vue/no-v-html --> + <!-- eslint-disable-next-line vue/no-v-html --> + <!-- Security: Content is sanitized via DOMPurify before rendering --> <div class="markdown text-wrap" v-html="raw"></div>frontend/assets/css/main.css (1)
32-39
: LGTM! Consider making scrollbar width configurable.The scrollbar styling is well-implemented. Consider making the width configurable via a CSS variable for better maintainability.
+:root { + --scrollbar-width: 0.5rem; +} .scroll-bg::-webkit-scrollbar { - width: 0.5rem; + width: var(--scrollbar-width); }frontend/components/Form/TextArea.vue (1)
Line range hint
77-82
: Implement safeguards for auto-grow functionalityThe auto-grow feature could be exploited for DoS attacks by submitting large amounts of text or newlines. Consider:
- Adding a maximum height limit
- Implementing rate limiting for resize operations
- Adding a maximum resize iterations check
Add height limits:
function setHeight() { + const MAX_HEIGHT = 500; // pixels el.value.style.height = "auto"; - el.value.style.height = el.value.scrollHeight + 5 + "px"; + const newHeight = Math.min(el.value.scrollHeight + 5, MAX_HEIGHT); + el.value.style.height = `${newHeight}px`; }frontend/components/Form/TextField.vue (1)
Line range hint
1-100
: Security Advisory: Add CSRF ProtectionWhile the component handles basic input validation, it should be used within a form that implements CSRF protection.
Ensure the parent form includes:
- CSRF tokens
- Rate limiting
- Input validation at the API level
Consider implementing these security headers in your application:
- Content-Security-Policy
- X-Frame-Options
- X-XSS-Protection
frontend/composables/use-formatters.ts (1)
86-86
: Approve explicit return type and suggest additional validationThe explicit string return type improves type safety. However, consider adding input validation for the format parameter.
Apply this diff to add format validation:
-export function fmtDate(value: string | Date, fmt: DateTimeFormat = "human"): string { +export function fmtDate(value: string | Date, fmt: DateTimeFormat = "human"): string { + const validFormats: DateTimeFormat[] = ["relative", "long", "short", "human"]; + if (!validFormats.includes(fmt)) { + console.warn(`Invalid format: ${fmt}. Defaulting to "human"`); + fmt = "human"; + }frontend/components/Form/Autocomplete2.vue (1)
Line range hint
1-190
: Security RecommendationsSeveral security considerations for this component:
Input Validation:
- Add input length limits to prevent DoS attacks
- Validate search input format
XSS Prevention:
- Ensure all displayed values are properly escaped
- Use v-text instead of v-html where possible
Object Property Access:
- Add type checking before accessing properties
- Consider using optional chaining
Consider implementing these security enhancements:
+ const MAX_SEARCH_LENGTH = 100; + const sanitizedSearch = search.value.slice(0, MAX_SEARCH_LENGTH); + // Type guard for item access + function isValidItem(item: unknown): item is { id: number, treeString: string } { + return typeof item === 'object' + && item !== null + && 'id' in item + && 'treeString' in item; + }frontend/pages/item/[id]/index.vue (1)
Security Vulnerabilities Confirmed - Action Required
Based on the code analysis, several critical security issues need immediate attention:
Markdown Content:
- Raw markdown content is rendered without sanitization (
<Markdown :source="item.description">
)- No HTML sanitization implementation found in the codebase
File Attachments:
- Direct URL construction for attachments using
api.authURL()
without proper path validation- Missing file type validation for uploads
- No Content-Security-Policy headers for attachment rendering
Authentication:
- Basic auth middleware present but lacks comprehensive security checks
- Token-based authentication exists but CSRF protection is missing for state-changing operations
Required Changes:
- Implement DOMPurify or similar HTML sanitization for markdown rendering
- Add file type validation in
dropAttachment
handler- Implement proper CSRF protection for attachment operations
- Add Content-Security-Policy headers for attachment downloads
- Add rate limiting for API operations
🔗 Analysis chain
Line range hint
1-24
: Security Review: Address potential vulnerabilitiesSeveral security considerations should be addressed:
XSS Prevention:
- Ensure the Markdown renderer sanitizes HTML content
- Validate and sanitize user input in
item.description
File Security:
- Implement proper access controls for attachment downloads
- Validate file paths to prevent path traversal
- Add Content-Security-Policy headers for attachment rendering
Data Protection:
- Consider masking sensitive data (serial numbers, asset IDs)
- Implement rate limiting for API calls
- Add audit logging for sensitive data access
State Changes:
- Add CSRF protection for quantity adjustment
- Implement proper validation for all user inputs
Let's verify the markdown sanitization:
Check for proper CSRF protection:
Also applies to: 237-237
Let me search for more specific patterns to verify the security concerns:
Let me also check for specific security-related implementations:
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check if markdown sanitization is implemented rg -l "sanitize|DOMPurify|markdownit" --type vueLength of output: 78
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Look for CSRF token usage in API calls rg -A 5 "api\.(items|attachments)\.(patch|post|put|delete)"Length of output: 1288
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for markdown rendering components and sanitization rg -A 5 "v-html|markdown|description" --type typescript --type javascript --type vue # Check for file download and attachment handling rg -A 5 "download|attachment" --type typescript --type javascript --type vue # Check for API security configurations rg -A 5 "csrf|token|headers" frontend/lib/api/Length of output: 9278
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for input validation and sanitization rg -A 5 "validate|sanitize|clean|escape" --type typescript --type javascript --type vue # Look for Content-Security-Policy implementations rg -A 5 "Content-Security-Policy|CSP" # Check for rate limiting implementations rg -A 5 "rateLimit|throttle|limit" frontend/lib/api/Length of output: 702
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for markdown rendering implementation rg -p "markdown|description" frontend/pages/item/ # Check for file attachment handling rg -p "attachment|download" frontend/pages/item/ # Check for API security implementation in the frontend rg -p "Authorization|Bearer|headers" frontend/lib/api/base/Length of output: 4880
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Look for authentication middleware rg -p "auth|middleware" frontend/middleware/ # Check for API request implementations rg -p "fetch|axios|request" frontend/lib/api/base/ -A 10 # Look for file type validation rg -p "mimetype|fileType|contentType" frontend/Length of output: 1208
🛑 Comments failed to post (9)
frontend/components/Form/TextArea.vue (2)
12-12: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Refactor complex template expressions into computed properties
The length display logic contains complex inline expressions that could be moved to computed properties for better maintainability and testing.
Consider this refactoring:
+ const showLengthInfo = computed(() => + typeof value.value === "string" && (props.maxLength !== -1 || props.minLength !== -1) + ); + const lengthDisplay = computed(() => + showLengthInfo.value ? `${value.value.length}/${props.maxLength}` : "" + ); - {{ typeof value === "string" && (maxLength !== -1 || minLength !== -1) ? `${value.length}/${maxLength}` : "" }} + {{ lengthDisplay }}Also applies to: 27-27
66-66:
⚠️ Potential issueEnhance prop validation for better security
The current prop validation only checks types. Consider adding custom validators to ensure:
- maxLength is greater than minLength when both are set
- Neither can be zero or negative (except -1)
- Values are within reasonable bounds to prevent DoS attacks
Add custom validators:
maxLength: { type: Number, default: -1, required: false, + validator: (value: number) => value === -1 || value > 0 }, minLength: { type: Number, default: -1, required: false, + validator: (value: number) => value === -1 || value > 0 },Also applies to: 71-71
frontend/components/Form/TextField.vue (3)
12-12: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider adding input sanitization
While the character count display logic is correct, the component could benefit from additional security measures.
Consider adding input sanitization:
<input ref="input" v-model="value" + @input="sanitizeInput" :placeholder="placeholder" :type="type" :required="required" class="input input-bordered w-full" /> +<script setup> +const sanitizeInput = (event: Event) => { + const target = event.target as HTMLInputElement; + // Remove potentially dangerous characters + target.value = target.value.replace(/[<>]/g, ''); +}; +</script>Also applies to: 34-34
79-79: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider adding type validation for numeric inputs
The props definition changes look good, but when
type="number"
is used, consider adding numeric range validation.Add validation for numeric inputs:
props = defineProps({ // ... existing props + min: { + type: Number, + default: null + }, + max: { + type: Number, + default: null + } }); +const validateNumericInput = (val: string) => { + if (props.type === 'number' && props.min !== null && props.max !== null) { + const num = Number(val); + return num >= props.min && num <= props.max; + } + return true; +};Also applies to: 84-84
9-9: 💡 Codebase verification
Security Recommendation: Add Input Length Constraints to Props Definition
The TextField component's validation logic has been updated to use
-1
as a sentinel value, but I notice the props definition doesn't includemaxLength
andminLength
props with their constraints. For proper security:
- Add explicit prop definitions for
maxLength
andminLength
with appropriate type validation- Consider adding reasonable default maximum lengths to prevent potential DoS attacks
- Document the expected length constraints in the component props
maxLength: { type: Number, default: -1, validator: (value) => value === -1 || (value > 0 && value <= 1000) }, minLength: { type: Number, default: -1, validator: (value) => value === -1 || value >= 0 }
🔗 Analysis chain
LGTM: Length validation logic updated correctly
The validation logic has been updated to use
-1
as the sentinel value, which is a cleaner approach than checking for null.Let's verify this component's usage to ensure proper validation:
Also applies to: 31-31
Let me try a different approach to analyze the validation patterns and component usage. The previous command failed because the vue file type wasn't recognized, so I'm broadening the search to catch any relevant files and understand the validation patterns better.
I noticed the TextField component is used in multiple places. Let's examine its actual usage patterns and props validation to ensure the length validation is properly implemented and used securely across the application.
Let's try a different approach to examine the TextField component implementation and its usage patterns. The previous commands might have failed due to file path escaping issues, so I'm adjusting the search patterns and file paths.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for instances where TextField is used with length constraints rg -l "TextField.*maxLength|TextField.*minLength" --type vueLength of output: 90
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Search for TextField usage patterns with different file extensions rg -l "TextField.*maxLength|TextField.*minLength" --type-list rg -l "TextField.*maxLength|TextField.*minLength" # Search for TextField component usage rg -l "TextField" # Look for any form validation patterns rg "maxLength.*minLength" -A 5 -B 5Length of output: 5213
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Let's examine how TextField is used in the identified files rg -A 5 -B 5 "<TextField.*>" frontend/pages/location/\[id\].vue frontend/pages/profile.vue frontend/pages/index.vue frontend/pages/item/new.vue frontend/pages/label/\[id\].vue frontend/pages/items.vue frontend/pages/item/\[id\]/index/edit.vue frontend/components/Location/CreateModal.vue frontend/components/Maintenance/EditModal.vue frontend/components/Item/CreateModal.vue frontend/components/Label/CreateModal.vue frontend/components/Form/Password.vue # Also check for any props validation in the component rg "props:|Props:" -A 20 frontend/components/Form/TextField.vueLength of output: 522
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Try a different approach to find TextField usage patterns rg -A 10 "TextField" frontend/components/Form/TextField.vue # Look for prop definitions with a more flexible pattern rg "defineProps|props:" -A 20 frontend/components/Form/TextField.vue # Check for actual TextField usage in components with proper escaping rg -A 5 -B 5 "<TextField" frontend/components/{Location,Maintenance,Item,Label}/*Modal.vue frontend/pages/{location,profile,index,items}*.vueLength of output: 801
frontend/composables/use-formatters.ts (2)
48-49:
⚠️ Potential issueStrengthen input validation for time formatters
The regex pattern
/\d/
could match partial numbers within strings. Consider using a more strict pattern like/^\d+$/
to ensure the entire string contains only digits.Apply this diff to improve security:
- past: n => (n.match(/\d/) ? t("components.global.date_time.ago", [n]) : n), - future: n => (n.match(/\d/) ? t("components.global.date_time.in", [n]) : n), + past: n => (n.match(/^\d+$/) ? t("components.global.date_time.ago", [n]) : n), + future: n => (n.match(/^\d+$/) ? t("components.global.date_time.in", [n]) : n),📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.past: n => (n.match(/^\d+$/) ? t("components.global.date_time.ago", [n]) : n), future: n => (n.match(/^\d+$/) ? t("components.global.date_time.in", [n]) : n),
74-76:
⚠️ Potential issueSanitize numeric inputs in time formatters
The time unit formatters directly interpolate the
n
parameter without validation. Consider adding type checking and range validation.Apply this diff to improve security:
- hour: n => `${n} ${n === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.hour") : t("components.global.date_time.hours")}`, - minute: n => `${n} ${n === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.minute") : t("components.global.date_time.minutes")}`, - second: n => `${n} ${n === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.second") : t("components.global.date_time.seconds")}`, + hour: n => { + const value = Math.max(0, parseInt(String(n), 10)); + return `${value} ${value === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.hour") : t("components.global.date_time.hours")}`; + }, + minute: n => { + const value = Math.max(0, parseInt(String(n), 10)); + return `${value} ${value === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.minute") : t("components.global.date_time.minutes")}`; + }, + second: n => { + const value = Math.max(0, parseInt(String(n), 10)); + return `${value} ${value === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.second") : t("components.global.date_time.seconds")}`; + },📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.hour: n => { const value = Math.max(0, parseInt(String(n), 10)); return `${value} ${value === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.hour") : t("components.global.date_time.hours")}`; }, minute: n => { const value = Math.max(0, parseInt(String(n), 10)); return `${value} ${value === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.minute") : t("components.global.date_time.minutes")}`; }, second: n => { const value = Math.max(0, parseInt(String(n), 10)); return `${value} ${value === 1 ? t("components.global.date_time.second") : t("components.global.date_time.seconds")}`; },
frontend/pages/tools.vue (1)
59-59: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider using a secure HTML rendering component
Multiple instances of v-html suggest a need for a reusable secure rendering solution. Consider creating a dedicated component that handles HTML sanitization consistently.
Create a new component like this:
<!-- SafeHTML.vue --> <template> <div v-html="sanitizedContent"></div> </template> <script setup lang="ts"> import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'; const props = defineProps<{ content: string }>(); const sanitizedContent = computed(() => DOMPurify.sanitize(props.content)); </script>Then replace v-html usage with:
-<div v-html="$t('tools.actions_sub')"></div> +<SafeHTML :content="$t('tools.actions_sub')" />Also applies to: 77-77, 83-83
frontend/components/Item/View/Table.vue (1)
153-156: 🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider implementing field-level access control.
While the formatting looks good, consider implementing field-level access control for sensitive fields like
purchasePrice
andlocation
based on user roles.Example implementation:
const defaultHeaders = [ { text: "items.name", value: "name", enabled: true, type: "name", requiredRole: "viewer" // Add role-based access }, { text: "items.purchase_price", value: "purchasePrice", enabled: hasRole("finance"), // Restrict sensitive fields type: "price", requiredRole: "finance" } ]
@@ -63,10 +63,12 @@ | |||
}, | |||
maxLength: { | |||
type: Number, | |||
default: -1, |
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Not sure if -1 is the best default.
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I'm not entirely sure on this one either, either -1
or maybe Number.MAX_VALUE
from Typescript?
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@katosdev thoughts?
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Caution
Inline review comments failed to post. This is likely due to GitHub's limits when posting large numbers of comments.
Actionable comments posted: 1
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
frontend/package.json (1)
26-26
: Security: Review dependency management practices.While the addition of
@vue/runtime-core
is safe, here are some security recommendations:
- Consider adding
package-lock.json
oryarn.lock
to pin all dependency versions- Run regular security audits using
npm audit
oryarn audit
- Consider adding a
.npmrc
file withsave-exact=true
to prevent floating versionsWould you like me to provide a template for the
.npmrc
configuration?
🛑 Comments failed to post (1)
frontend/package.json (1)
26-26: 💡 Codebase verification
⚠️ Potential issue
⚠️ Version mismatch and security concerns detectedThe version mismatch between Vue packages poses both compatibility and security risks:
vue
is locked at version3.4.8
@vue/runtime-core
uses^3.5.12
(allows minor updates)vue-router
at^4.4.5
vue-i18n
at^9.14.1
Security recommendations:
- Lock all Vue-related core packages to the same major.minor version (3.4.x) to prevent unexpected behavior and potential security issues
- Remove the caret (^) from version numbers to prevent automatic minor updates that could introduce vulnerabilities
- Consider upgrading all Vue packages together after proper testing
Example fix in package.json:
"@vue/runtime-core": "3.4.8", "vue": "3.4.8", "vue-router": "4.4.5", "vue-i18n": "9.14.1"🔗 Analysis chain
Version mismatch with Vue core package detected.
The added
@vue/runtime-core@^3.5.12
is at a higher version than the Vue core package ([email protected]
). This version mismatch could potentially lead to compatibility issues.Consider either:
- Upgrading Vue core to match:
"vue": "^3.5.12"
- Or pinning runtime-core to match Vue's version:
"@vue/runtime-core": "3.4.8"
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Verify if there are any other Vue related packages that might be affected rg '"vue.*": ".*"' package.jsonLength of output: 33
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check package.json content to see all Vue related dependencies cat frontend/package.jsonLength of output: 2382
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Actionable comments posted: 3
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
frontend/test/vitest.config.ts (1)
6-8
: Consider documenting the test setup configuration.The globalSetup configuration is a crucial part of the test infrastructure. Consider adding a comment explaining its purpose and any important considerations for developers.
Add documentation above the test configuration:
+ /** + * Test configuration + * globalSetup: Runs before all tests to set up the test environment + * For security reasons, ensure the setup file doesn't execute untrusted code + */ test: { globalSetup: "./test/setup.ts", },
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
⛔ Files ignored due to path filters (1)
frontend/pnpm-lock.yaml
is excluded by!**/pnpm-lock.yaml
📒 Files selected for processing (7)
- frontend/components/Form/Autocomplete2.vue (5 hunks)
- frontend/components/Maintenance/ListView.vue (1 hunks)
- frontend/composables/use-preferences.ts (1 hunks)
- frontend/pages/item/[id]/index/edit.vue (4 hunks)
- frontend/pages/label/[id].vue (3 hunks)
- frontend/pages/reports/label-generator.vue (3 hunks)
- frontend/test/vitest.config.ts (1 hunks)
✅ Files skipped from review due to trivial changes (1)
- frontend/composables/use-preferences.ts
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (4)
- frontend/components/Form/Autocomplete2.vue
- frontend/components/Maintenance/ListView.vue
- frontend/pages/item/[id]/index/edit.vue
- frontend/pages/label/[id].vue
🔇 Additional comments (2)
frontend/test/vitest.config.ts (1)
5-5
:⚠️ Potential issueAvoid using @ts-ignore.
The
@ts-ignore
comment suppresses TypeScript type checking, which could hide potential type-related issues. Consider fixing the underlying type error instead.Let's check if there are other instances of ts-ignore that might indicate a pattern:
#!/bin/bash # Search for ts-ignore usage across the codebase rg "@ts-ignore" --type ts --type vuefrontend/pages/reports/label-generator.vue (1)
222-227
:⚠️ Potential issueAdd input validation to prevent XSS attacks
The current implementation directly renders user-provided data (
item.name
anditem.location.name
) in the template without sanitization. This could lead to XSS vulnerabilities if the API response contains malicious content.Consider adding validation and sanitization:
const item = allFields?.value?.items?.[i]; +const sanitizeText = (text: string) => { + return text.replace(/[<>]/g, ''); +}; if (item?.location) { + // Validate and sanitize input + const sanitizedName = sanitizeText(item.name || ''); + const sanitizedLocation = sanitizeText(item.location.name || ''); + const sanitizedItem = { + name: sanitizedName, + location: { name: sanitizedLocation } + }; - items.push(getItem(i, item as { location: { name: string }; name: string })); + items.push(getItem(i, sanitizedItem)); } else { items.push(getItem(i, null)); }Additionally, consider adding runtime type validation using a schema validation library like Zod or Yup to ensure the API response matches the expected structure.
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Actionable comments posted: 2
📜 Review details
Configuration used: CodeRabbit UI
Review profile: CHILL
📒 Files selected for processing (3)
- .github/workflows/partial-frontend.yaml (1 hunks)
- frontend/lib/api/classes/items.ts (2 hunks)
- frontend/lib/api/types/non-generated.ts (1 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (7)
frontend/lib/api/types/non-generated.ts (1)
20-26
:⚠️ Security: Review exposure of financial data in pagination results.The
totalPrice
field in pagination results could potentially expose sensitive financial information. Consider:
- Implementing proper access controls
- Adding rate limiting to prevent data scraping
- Evaluating if this aggregate data is necessary in pagination responses
✅ Verification successful
Let me check for authentication mechanisms and API endpoint implementations.
Let me check for authentication middleware and security configurations.
✅ Financial data is properly secured with authentication
The API endpoints that expose the
ItemSummaryPaginationResult
(includingtotalPrice
) are protected by:
- Bearer token authentication required for all API endpoints
- Auth middleware that validates tokens and redirects unauthorized requests
- Frontend pages using the API are protected with auth middleware
The security concern about exposing financial data is addressed through proper authentication controls. However, for additional security, consider:
- Implementing rate limiting on the API endpoints
- Adding role-based access control for financial data
- Logging access to sensitive financial endpoints
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for any authentication/authorization mechanisms around this API rg -A 5 "ItemSummaryPaginationResult"Length of output: 1298
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for authentication middleware and route handlers rg -B 5 -A 10 "route\(\"/items\"" # Check for HTTP client implementation and auth headers rg -B 5 "class.*Http" # Look for auth guards or middleware ast-grep --pattern 'class $_ implements $_ { $$$ get<$_>($_) { $$$ } $$$ }'Length of output: 1372
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check for auth middleware or guards rg -B 3 -A 3 "middleware.*auth" # Look for security configurations rg -B 3 -A 3 "security|authentication|authorization" # Check for rate limiting implementations rg -B 3 -A 3 "rateLimit|rate-limit" # Check HTTP client configuration ast-grep --pattern 'class Http { $$$ constructor($_) { $$$ } $$$ }'Length of output: 110126
.github/workflows/partial-frontend.yaml (2)
Line range hint
1-52
: Verify the impact of pnpm version update on the frontend tests.The workflow changes appear correct, but since this PR aims to "Get front end tests passing", we should verify that the pnpm version update actually helps resolve the test issues.
Let's check the test failure history:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check recent workflow runs to see if test failures correlate with pnpm versions # Look for previous workflow runs and their status gh run list --workflow=".github/workflows/partial-frontend.yaml" --limit 5 --json status,conclusion,createdAt # Check commit messages for any test-related fixes git log --grep="test" --grep="pnpm" -i --pretty=format:"%h %s" -n 5
18-18
: Security: Consider using version ranges for better maintainability.Using fixed versions (9.12.2, 6.0.2) ensures reproducibility but might miss security updates. Consider using version ranges (e.g., ~9.12.2) to automatically get patch updates while maintaining compatibility.
Let's check if there are any security advisories for pnpm versions:
Also applies to: 52-52
frontend/lib/api/classes/items.ts (4)
15-15
: LGTM: Type import change aligns with pagination enhancementThe change from
PaginationResult
toItemSummaryPaginationResult
reflects the enhanced pagination type that includes total price information.
101-101
: LGTM: Return type updated consistentlyThe return type change in
getAll()
correctly implements the newItemSummaryPaginationResult
type.
Line range hint
32-49
: Enhance file upload security measuresThe file upload endpoints in
AttachmentsAPI.add()
,ItemsApi.import()
, and related methods should implement:
- File type validation
- File size limits
- Antivirus scanning if possible
- Content-Type verification
This helps prevent malicious file uploads and potential security vulnerabilities.
#!/bin/bash # Check for existing file validation logic rg -A 5 "file.*validation|mime.*type|content.*type" frontend/ # Look for file size limit implementations rg -A 5 "maxFileSize|size.*limit" frontend/Also applies to: 124-131, 144-150
Line range hint
19-29
: Consider input validation for query parametersThe
ItemsQuery
type allows for various query parameters that could potentially be manipulated for malicious purposes. Consider implementing:
- Input validation for
page
andpageSize
to prevent DoS attacks- Sanitization of
q
parameter to prevent injection attacks- Length limits on arrays (
locations
,labels
,parentIds
)
… when no label is present
… PaginationResult, and handle error in label generator more gracefully
What type of PR is this?
(REQUIRED)
What this PR does / why we need it:
(REQUIRED)
Summary by CodeRabbit
Release Notes
New Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation
Style
FormTextArea
,FormTextField
, and various modals.Chores