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New rule: VIP local_part impersonation from unsolicited sender (#2140)
Co-authored-by: ID Generator <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Josh Kamdjou <[email protected]>
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name: "VIP local_part impersonation from unsolicited sender" | ||
description: "This rule identifies potential impersonation attempts involving the local part of an $org_vip email address. Specifically, it checks for cases where the local part of an $org_vip email (e.g., [email protected]) appears with a different domain (e.g., [email protected]). Additionally, the rule flags messages that match an $org_vip address exactly but fail authentication." | ||
type: "rule" | ||
severity: "high" | ||
source: | | ||
type.inbound | ||
and any($org_vips, | ||
strings.contains(sender.email.local_part, ".") | ||
and strings.starts_with(.email, sender.email.local_part) | ||
and ( | ||
sender.email.email != .email | ||
or ( | ||
sender.email.email == .email and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass | ||
) | ||
) | ||
) | ||
and ( | ||
// ignore personal <> work emails | ||
// where the sender and mailbox's display name are the same | ||
length(recipients.to) > 0 | ||
or length(recipients.cc) > 0 | ||
or sender.display_name != mailbox.display_name | ||
) | ||
// bounce-back negations | ||
and not strings.like(sender.email.local_part, | ||
"*postmaster*", | ||
"*mailer-daemon*", | ||
"*administrator*" | ||
) | ||
// negate org domains unless they fail DMARC authentication | ||
and ( | ||
( | ||
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $org_domains | ||
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass | ||
) | ||
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains | ||
) | ||
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication | ||
and ( | ||
( | ||
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains | ||
and not headers.auth_summary.dmarc.pass | ||
) | ||
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains | ||
) | ||
and not profile.by_sender().solicited | ||
tags: | ||
- "Attack surface reduction" | ||
tactics_and_techniques: | ||
- "Impersonation: VIP" | ||
- "Spoofing" | ||
detection_methods: | ||
- "Header analysis" | ||
- "Sender analysis" | ||
id: "74035fdc-78c4-5a29-83d8-c1060ead4e28" |