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New Rule: Link Quickbooks Image lure with suspicious link by @morriscode #933 Source SHA d96ffce Triggered by @morriscode
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detection-rules/link_quickbooks_image_lure_suspicious_link.yml
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name: "Link: QuickBooks image lure with suspicious link" | ||
description: "This rule detects messages with image attachments containing QuickBooks logo containing exactly 1 link to a suspicious URL. " | ||
type: "rule" | ||
severity: "medium" | ||
source: "type.inbound\nand length(attachments) < 3\nand length(body.links) == 1\nand (\n // body text is very short\n (\n 0 <= (length(body.current_thread.text)) < 10\n or body.current_thread.text is null\n )\n or (\n length(body.current_thread.text) < 900\n // or body is most likely all warning banner (text contains the sender and common warning banner language)\n and (\n regex.icontains(body.current_thread.text,\n 'caution|confidentiality notice|warning'\n )\n )\n and any(attachments,\n .file_type in $file_types_images\n and any(ml.logo_detect(.).brands, .name == \"Quickbooks\")\n )\n )\n)\n// suspicious link\nand any(body.links,\n (\n .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $tranco_1m\n or .href_url.domain.domain in $free_file_hosts\n or .href_url.domain.root_domain in $free_subdomain_hosts\n or .href_url.domain.domain in $url_shorteners\n or \n\n // mass mailer link, masks the actual URL\n .href_url.domain.root_domain in (\n \"hubspotlinks.com\",\n \"mandrillapp.com\",\n \"sendgrid.net\",\n \"rs6.net\"\n )\n )\n\n // exclude sources of potential FPs\n and (\n .href_url.domain.root_domain not in (\n \"svc.ms\",\n \"sharepoint.com\",\n \"1drv.ms\",\n \"microsoft.com\",\n \"aka.ms\",\n \"msftauthimages.net\",\n \"intuit.com\",\n \"turbotax.com\",\n \"intuit.ca\"\n )\n or any(body.links, .href_url.domain.domain in $free_file_hosts)\n )\n and .href_url.domain.root_domain not in $org_domains\n)\nand sender.email.domain.root_domain not in~ (\n 'intuit.com',\n 'turbotax.com',\n 'intuit.ca'\n)\n\n// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication\nand (\n (\n sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains\n and (\n any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null),\n strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, \"*fail\")\n )\n )\n )\n or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains\n)\n \n" | ||
attack_types: | ||
- "Credential Phishing" | ||
tactics_and_techniques: | ||
- "Impersonation: Brand" | ||
- "Social engineering" | ||
detection_methods: | ||
- "Computer Vision" | ||
- "File analysis" | ||
- "Optical Character Recognition" | ||
- "URL analysis" | ||
id: "3826a923-865e-5d87-82e4-0c1f8434efc0" | ||
testing_pr: 933 | ||
testing_sha: d96ffce8133f7db15622ebcdf5ca4d0314a87fc4 |