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New Rule: BEC/Fraud: PenPal Scam by @morriscode #1004 Source SHA 5c170e5 Triggered by @jkamdjou
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Nov 21, 2023
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name: "BEC/Fraud: PenPal Scam" | ||
description: "This rule detects messages from individuals looking to establish contact under the guise of seeking friendship or a penpal relationship. Over time, they build trust and then exploit this relationship by asking for money, personal information, or involvement in suspicious activities." | ||
type: "rule" | ||
severity: "medium" | ||
source: | | ||
type.inbound | ||
// the sender or the reply-to is a freemail provider | ||
and ( | ||
sender.email.domain.domain in $free_email_providers | ||
or any(headers.reply_to, | ||
.email.domain.root_domain in $free_email_providers | ||
and not sender.email.domain.root_domain in $free_email_providers | ||
) | ||
) | ||
// body contains pen ?pal | ||
and regex.contains(body.current_thread.text, 'pen\s?pal') | ||
// not a reply | ||
and ( | ||
length(headers.references) == 0 | ||
or not any(headers.hops, any(.fields, strings.ilike(.name, "In-Reply-To"))) | ||
) | ||
// new sender | ||
and ( | ||
( | ||
profile.by_sender().prevalence in ("new", "outlier") | ||
and not profile.by_sender().solicited | ||
) | ||
or profile.by_sender().any_messages_malicious_or_spam | ||
) | ||
and not profile.by_sender().any_false_positives | ||
// negate highly trusted sender domains unless they fail DMARC authentication | ||
and ( | ||
( | ||
sender.email.domain.root_domain in $high_trust_sender_root_domains | ||
and ( | ||
any(distinct(headers.hops, .authentication_results.dmarc is not null), | ||
strings.ilike(.authentication_results.dmarc, "*fail") | ||
) | ||
) | ||
) | ||
or sender.email.domain.root_domain not in $high_trust_sender_root_domains | ||
) | ||
attack_types: | ||
- "BEC/Fraud" | ||
tactics_and_techniques: | ||
- "Free email provider" | ||
- "Social engineering" | ||
detection_methods: | ||
- "Content analysis" | ||
- "Header analysis" | ||
- "Sender analysis" | ||
id: "a4bdfa17-7527-5ee2-a27b-44d03e190773" | ||
testing_pr: 1004 | ||
testing_sha: 5c170e5c384f56452015fdb0b13c5a5f5120bbe2 |