Fix a number of typos (#34385)

* Update vote-accounts.md

* Update what-is-a-validator.md

* Update what-is-a-validator.md

* Update accounts-db-replication.md

* Update blockstore-rocksdb-compaction.md

* Update rip-curl.md

* Update ledger-replication-to-implement.md

* Update optimistic_confirmation.md

* Update return-data.md

* Update handle-duplicate-block.md

* Update timely-vote-credits.md

* Update optimistic-transaction-propagation-signal.md

* Update simple-payment-and-state-verification.md

* Update off-chain-message-signing.md

* Update mod.rs

* Update elgamal.rs

* Update ledger.md

* Update deploy-a-program.md

* Update staking-rewards.md

* Update reliable-vote-transmission.md

* Update repair-service.md

* Update abi-management.md

* Update testing-programs.md

* Update docs/src/implemented-proposals/staking-rewards.md

Co-authored-by: Tyera <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: Tyera <[email protected]>

docs/src/cli/examples/deploy-a-program.md

@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ $ sha256sum extended.so dump.so
 
 Instead of deploying directly to the program account, the program can be written
 to an intermediary buffer account. Intermediary accounts can be useful for
-things like multi-entity governed programs where the governing members fist
+things like multi-entity governed programs where the governing members first
 verify the intermediary buffer contents and then vote to allow an upgrade using
 it.
 

docs/src/cli/wallets/hardware/ledger.md

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ solana balance 7cvkjYAkUYs4W8XcXsca7cBrEGFeSUjeZmKoNBvEwyri
 
 You can also view the balance of any account address on the Accounts tab in the
 [Explorer](https://explorer.solana.com/accounts) and paste the address in the
-box to view the balance in you web browser.
+box to view the balance in your web browser.
 
 Note: Any address with a balance of 0 SOL, such as a newly created one on your
 Ledger, will show as "Not Found" in the explorer. Empty accounts and

docs/src/implemented-proposals/abi-management.md

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ name suggests, there is no need to implement `AbiEnumVisitor` for other types.
 To summarize this interplay, `serde` handles the recursive serialization control
 flow in tandem with `AbiDigester`. The initial entry point in tests and child
 `AbiDigester`s use `AbiExample` recursively to create an example object
-hierarchal graph. And `AbiDigester` uses `AbiEnumVisitor` to inquiry the actual
+hierarchical graph. And `AbiDigester` uses `AbiEnumVisitor` to inquiry the actual
 ABI information using the constructed sample.
 
 `Default` isn't enough for `AbiExample`. Various collection's `::default()` is
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ On the other hand, ABI digesting can't be done only with `AbiExample`, either.
 `AbiEnumVisitor` is required because all variants of an `enum` cannot be
 traversed just with a single variant of it as a ABI example.
 
-Digestable information:
+Digestible information:
 
 - rust's type name
 - `serde`'s data type name
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ Digestable information:
 - `enum`: normal variants and `struct`- and `tuple`- styles.
 - attributes: `serde(serialize_with=...)` and `serde(skip)`
 
-Not digestable information:
+Not digestible information:
 
 - Any custom serialize code path not touched by the sample provided by
   `AbiExample`. (technically not possible)

docs/src/implemented-proposals/reliable-vote-transmission.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Validator votes are messages that have a critical function for consensus and con
 
 1. Leader rotation is triggered by PoH, which is clock with high drift. So many nodes are likely to have an incorrect view if the next leader is active in realtime or not.
 2. The next leader may be easily be flooded. Thus a DDOS would not only prevent delivery of regular transactions, but also consensus messages.
-3. UDP is unreliable, and our asynchronous protocol requires any message that is transmitted to be retransmitted until it is observed in the ledger. Retransmittion could potentially cause an unintentional _thundering herd_ against the leader with a large number of validators. Worst case flood would be `(num_nodes * num_retransmits)`.
+3. UDP is unreliable, and our asynchronous protocol requires any message that is transmitted to be retransmitted until it is observed in the ledger. Retransmission could potentially cause an unintentional _thundering herd_ against the leader with a large number of validators. Worst case flood would be `(num_nodes * num_retransmits)`.
 4. Tracking if the vote has been transmitted or not via the ledger does not guarantee it will appear in a confirmed block. The current observed block may be unrolled. Validators would need to maintain state for each vote and fork.
 
 ## Design

docs/src/implemented-proposals/repair-service.md

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ The different protocol strategies to address the above challenges:
    Blockstore tracks the latest root slot. RepairService will then periodically
    iterate every fork in blockstore starting from the root slot, sending repair
    requests to validators for any missing shreds. It will send at most some `N`
-   repair reqeusts per iteration. Shred repair should prioritize repairing
+   repair requests per iteration. Shred repair should prioritize repairing
    forks based on the leader's fork weight. Validators should only send repair
    requests to validators who have marked that slot as completed in their
    EpochSlots. Validators should prioritize repairing shreds in each slot

docs/src/implemented-proposals/staking-rewards.md

@@ -30,4 +30,4 @@ Solana's trustless sense of time and ordering provided by its PoH data structure
 
 As discussed in the [Economic Design](ed_overview/ed_overview.md) section, annual validator interest rates are to be specified as a function of total percentage of circulating supply that has been staked. The cluster rewards validators who are online and actively participating in the validation process throughout the entirety of their _validation period_. For validators that go offline/fail to validate transactions during this period, their annual reward is effectively reduced.
 
-Similarly, we may consider an algorithmic reduction in a validator's active amount staked amount in the case that they are offline. I.e. if a validator is inactive for some amount of time, either due to a partition or otherwise, the amount of their stake that is considered ‘active’ \(eligible to earn rewards\) may be reduced. This design would be structured to help long-lived partitions to eventually reach finality on their respective chains as the % of non-voting total stake is reduced over time until a supermajority can be achieved by the active validators in each partition. Similarly, upon re-engaging, the ‘active’ amount staked will come back online at some defined rate. Different rates of stake reduction may be considered depending on the size of the partition/active set.
+Similarly, we may consider an algorithmic reduction in a validator's active staked amount in the case that they are offline. I.e. if a validator is inactive for some amount of time, either due to a partition or otherwise, the amount of their stake that is considered ‘active’ \(eligible to earn rewards\) may be reduced. This design would be structured to help long-lived partitions to eventually reach finality on their respective chains as the % of non-voting total stake is reduced over time until a supermajority can be achieved by the active validators in each partition. Similarly, upon re-engaging, the ‘active’ amount staked will come back online at some defined rate. Different rates of stake reduction may be considered depending on the size of the partition/active set.

docs/src/implemented-proposals/testing-programs.md

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ trait SyncClient {
 }
 ```
 
-Users send transactions and asynchrounously and synchrounously await results.
+Users send transactions and asynchronously and synchronously await results.
 
 ### ThinClient for Clusters
 

docs/src/operations/guides/vote-accounts.md

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Rotating the vote account authority keys requires special handling when dealing
 with a live validator.
 
 Note that vote account key rotation has no effect on the stake accounts that
-have been delegate to the vote account. For example it is possible to use key
+have been delegated to the vote account. For example it is possible to use key
 rotation to transfer all authority of a vote account from one entity to another
 without any impact to staking rewards.
 

docs/src/proposals/accounts-db-replication.md

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ During replication we also need to replicate the information of accounts that ha
 up due to zero lamports, i.e. we need to be able to tell the difference between an account in a
 given slot which was not updated and hence has no storage entry in that slot, and one that
 holds 0 lamports and has been cleaned up through the history. We may record this via some
-"Tombstone" mechanism -- recording the dead accounts cleaned up fora slot. The tombstones
+"Tombstone" mechanism -- recording the dead accounts cleaned up for a slot. The tombstones
 themselves can be removed after exceeding the retention period expressed as epochs. Any
 attempt to replicate slots with tombstones removed will fail and the replica should skip
 this slot and try later ones.

docs/src/proposals/blockstore-rocksdb-compaction.md

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ close to 1 read amplification.  As each key is only inserted once, we have
 space amplification 1.
 
 ### Use Current Settings for Metadata Column Families
-The second type of the column families related to shred insertion is medadata
+The second type of the column families related to shred insertion is metadata
 column families.  These metadata column families contributes ~1% of the shred
 insertion data in size.  The largest metadata column family here is the Index
 column family, which occupies 0.8% of the shred insertion data.
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ in Solana's BlockStore use case:
 Here we discuss Level to FIFO and FIFO to Level migrations:
 
 ### Level to FIFO
-heoretically, FIFO compaction is the superset of all other compaction styles,
+Theoretically, FIFO compaction is the superset of all other compaction styles,
 as it does not have any assumption of the LSM tree structure.  However, the
 current RocksDB implementation does not offer such flexibility while it is
 theoretically doable.

docs/src/proposals/handle-duplicate-block.md

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Before a duplicate slot `S` is `duplicate_confirmed`, it's first excluded from t
 Some notes about the `DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD`. In the cases below, assume `DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD = 52`:
 
 a) If less than `2 * DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD - 1` percentage of the network is malicious, then there can only be one such `duplicate_confirmed` version of the slot. With `DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD = 52`, this is
-a malcious tolerance of `4%`
+a malicious tolerance of `4%`
 
 b) The liveness of the network is at most `1 - DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD - SWITCH_THRESHOLD`. This is because if you need at least `SWITCH_THRESHOLD` percentage of the stake voting on a different fork in order to switch off of a duplicate fork that has `< DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD` stake voting on it, and is *not* `duplicate_confirmed`. For `DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD = 52` and `DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD = 38`, this implies a liveness tolerance of `10%`.
 
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ For example in the situation below, validators that voted on `2` can't vote any
 
 ```
 
-3. Switching proofs need to be extended to allow including vote hashes from different versions of the same same slot (detected through 1). Right now this is not supported since switching proofs can
+3. Switching proofs need to be extended to allow including vote hashes from different versions of the same slot (detected through 1). Right now this is not supported since switching proofs can
 only be built using votes from banks in BankForks, and two different versions of the same slot cannot
 simultaneously exist in BankForks. For instance:
 
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ This problem we need to solve is modeled simply by the below scenario:
 ```
 Assume the following:
 
-1. Due to gossiping duplciate proofs, we assume everyone will eventually see duplicate proofs for 2 and 4, so everyone agrees to remove them from fork choice until they are `duplicate_confirmed`.
+1. Due to gossiping duplicate proofs, we assume everyone will eventually see duplicate proofs for 2 and 4, so everyone agrees to remove them from fork choice until they are `duplicate_confirmed`.
 
 2. Due to lockouts, `> DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD` of the stake votes on 4, but not 2. This means at least `DUPLICATE_THRESHOLD` of people have the "correct" version of both slots 2 and 4.
 

docs/src/proposals/ledger-replication-to-implement.md

@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ For each turn of the PoRep game, both Validators and Archivers evaluate each sta
 
 For any random seed, we force everyone to use a signature that is derived from a PoH hash at the turn boundary. Everyone uses the same count, so the same PoH hash is signed by every participant. The signatures are then each cryptographically tied to the keypair, which prevents a leader from grinding on the resulting value for more than 1 identity.
 
-Since there are many more client identities then encryption identities, we need to split the reward for multiple clients, and prevent Sybil attacks from generating many clients to acquire the same block of data. To remain BFT we want to avoid a single human entity from storing all the replications of a single chunk of the ledger.
+Since there are many more client identities than encryption identities, we need to split the reward for multiple clients, and prevent Sybil attacks from generating many clients to acquire the same block of data. To remain BFT we want to avoid a single human entity from storing all the replications of a single chunk of the ledger.
 
 Our solution to this is to force the clients to continue using the same identity. If the first round is used to acquire the same block for many client identities, the second round for the same client identities will force a redistribution of the signatures, and therefore PoRep identities and blocks. Thus to get a reward for archivers need to store the first block for free and the network can reward long lived client identities more than new ones.
 

docs/src/proposals/off-chain-message-signing.md

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ This may be any arbitrary bytes. For instance the on-chain address of a program,
 DAO instance, Candy Machine, etc.
 
 This field **SHOULD** be displayed to users as a base58-encoded ASCII string rather
-than interpretted otherwise.
+than interpreted otherwise.
 
 #### Message Format
 

docs/src/proposals/optimistic-transaction-propagation-signal.md

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ concatenating (1), (2), and (3)
 deduplicating this list of entries by pubkey favoring entries with contact info
 filtering this list by entries with contact info
 
-This list is then is randomly shuffled by stake weight.
+This list is then randomly shuffled by stake weight.
 
 Shreds are then retransmitted to up to FANOUT neighbors and up to FANOUT
 children.
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ First, only epoch staked nodes will be considered regardless of presence of
 contact info (and possibly including the validator node itself).
 
 A deterministic ordering of the epoch staked nodes will be created based on the
-derministic shred seed using weighted_shuffle.
+deterministic shred seed using weighted_shuffle.
 
 Let `neighbor_set` be selected from up to FANOUT neighbors of the current node.
 Let `child_set` be selected from up to FANOUT children of the current node.
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ distribution levels.
 distribution levels because of lack of contact info.
 - Current node was part of original epoch staked shuffle from retransmitter
 but was filtered out because of missing contact info. Current node subsequently
-receives retransmisison of shred and assumes that the retransmit was a result
+receives retransmission of shred and assumes that the retransmit was a result
 of the deterministic tree calculation and not from subsequent random selection.
 This should be benign because the current node will underestimate prior stake
 weight in the retransmission tree.
@@ -105,5 +105,5 @@ Practically, signals should fall into the following buckets:
 1.2. can signal layer 1 + subset of layer 2 when retransmit is sent
 3. layer 2
 3.1. can signal layer 2 when shred is received
-3.2. can signal layer 2 + subset of layer 3 when retrnasmit is sent
+3.2. can signal layer 2 + subset of layer 3 when retransmit is sent
 4. current node not a member of epoch staked nodes, no signal can be sent

docs/src/proposals/optimistic_confirmation.md

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ the votes must satisfy:
 
 - `X <= S.last`, `X' <= S'.last`
 - All `s` in `S` are ancestors/descendants of one another,
-  all `s'` in `S'` are ancsestors/descendants of one another,
+  all `s'` in `S'` are ancestors/descendants of one another,
 -
 - `X == X'` implies `S` is parent of `S'` or `S'` is a parent of `S`
 - `X' > X` implies `X' > S.last` and `S'.last > S.last`
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ true that `B' > X`
 ```
 
 `Proof`: Let `Vote(X, S)` be a vote in the `Optimistic Votes` set. Then by
-definition, given the "optimistcally confirmed" block `B`, `X <= B <= S.last`.
+definition, given the "optimistically confirmed" block `B`, `X <= B <= S.last`.
 
 Because `X` is a parent of `B`, and `B'` is not a parent or ancestor of `B`,
 then:
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ then:
 
 Now consider if `B'` < `X`:
 
-`Case B' < X`: We wll show this is a violation of lockouts.
+`Case B' < X`: We will show this is a violation of lockouts.
 From above, we know `B'` is not a parent of `X`. Then because `B'` was rooted,
 and `B'` is not a parent of `X`, then the validator should not have been able
 to vote on the higher slot `X` that does not descend from `B'`.
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ By `Lemma 2` we know `B' > X`, and from above `S_v.last > B'`, so then
 From above, `S.last >= B >= X` so for all such "switching votes", `X_v > B`.
 
 Now ordering all these "switching votes" in time, let `V` to be the validator
-in `Optimistic Validators` that first submitted such a "swtching vote"
+in `Optimistic Validators` that first submitted such a "switching vote"
 `Vote(X', S')`, where `X' > B`. We know that such a validator exists because
 we know from above that all delinquent validators must have submitted such
 a vote, and the delinquent validators are a subset of the

docs/src/proposals/return-data.md

@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ strings in the [stable log](https://github.com/solana-labs/solana/blob/952928419
 
 Solidity on Ethereum allows the contract to return an error in the return data. In this case, all
 the account data changes for the account should be reverted. On Solana, any non-zero exit code
-for a SBF prorgram means the entire transaction fails. We do not wish to support an error return
+for a SBF program means the entire transaction fails. We do not wish to support an error return
 by returning success and then returning an error in the return data. This would mean we would have
 to support reverting the account data changes; this too expensive both on the VM side and the SBF
 contract side.

docs/src/proposals/rip-curl.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Easier for validators to support:
   has no significant resource constraints.
 - Transaction status is never stored in memory and cannot be polled for.
 - Signatures are only stored in memory until the desired commitment level or
-  until the blockhash expires, which ever is later.
+  until the blockhash expires, whichever is later.
 
 How it works: