add poi verification before minting function #169
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WalkthroughThe pull request introduces updates to the Changes
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Actionable comments posted: 4
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (9)
subgraph/src/ipnftMapping.ts (1)
114-120: Consider improving the debug message clarity.The current debug message "no new uri found for token, likely just minted" could be more precise about the context.
Consider this improvement:
- log.debug('no new uri found for token, likely just minted {}', [ + log.debug('MetadataUpdate: No new URI found for token {}, this is expected for newly minted tokens', [ event.params._tokenId.toString() ])test/IPNFT.t.sol (2)
76-77: Consider using a dynamic POI hash for testing.The hardcoded POI hash makes the test less maintainable. Consider generating it dynamically or documenting its significance if it must remain hardcoded.
- bytes32 poiHash = 0x073cb54264ef688e56531a2d09ab47b14086b5c7813e3a23a2bd7b1bb6458a52; + bytes32 poiHash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked("test_poi_data"));
75-106: Consider adding more test cases for edge scenarios.The current test coverage for
mintWithPOIcould be enhanced by adding the following test cases:
- Empty POI hash
- Duplicate POI hash (attempting to mint with same POI twice)
- Invalid IPFS URI format
Would you like me to help generate these additional test cases?
subgraph/abis/IPNFT.json (2)
763-781: LGTM! Event structure is well-defined.The event parameters are appropriately defined with:
tokenIdindexed for efficient filteringpoinot indexed to avoid high gas costs with bytes dataConsider adding a comment in the contract's documentation to explain the purpose and usage of this event, particularly what constitutes valid POI data.
Line range hint
229-781: Consider adding POI-specific error types.The contract defines various error types but lacks POI-specific ones. Consider adding error types for POI validation scenarios:
Add these error types to handle POI-specific cases:
+ { + "type": "error", + "name": "InvalidPOI", + "inputs": [] + }, + { + "type": "error", + "name": "POIAlreadyUsed", + "inputs": [] + }src/IPNFT.sol (4)
106-106: Fix missing word in function documentationThe documentation in line 106 is missing the word "to" after "linked". It should read "This IPNFT is linked to a proof of idea..."
Apply this diff to correct the typo:
- * @notice mints an IPNFT with `tokenURI` as source of metadata. This IPNFT is linked a proof of idea (POI) which is a hash of any collection of files that represents an idea, anchored on any chain. + * @notice mints an IPNFT with `tokenURI` as source of metadata. This IPNFT is linked to a proof of idea (POI) which is a hash of any collection of files that represents an idea, anchored on any chain.
113-113: Clarify parameter description forauthorizationThe description for the
authorizationparameter could be clearer. Consider rewording it for better understanding.Apply this diff to improve clarity:
- * @param authorization a bytes encoded parameter that ensures that the poi is owned by the owner (to param) + * @param authorization a bytes-encoded parameter used to verify that the `to` address owns the POI
Line range hint
129-153: Add reentrancy protection tomintReservationfunctionSimilar to
mintWithPOI, themintReservationfunction ispayableand involves external calls and state changes.Apply the
nonReentrantmodifier to the function to enhance security:function mintReservation(address to, uint256 reservationId, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization) external payable override + nonReentrant whenNotPaused returns (uint256) { // ... }
107-107: Avoid duplicating documentation commentsThe notice about the nominal minting fee is duplicated in both
mintWithPOIandmintReservationfunctions.Consider removing the duplicate comment in
mintWithPOIor referencing a common documentation section to adhere to the DRY (Don't Repeat Yourself) principle.Also applies to: 129-129
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
- src/IPNFT.sol (3 hunks)
- subgraph/abis/IPNFT.json (2 hunks)
- subgraph/src/ipnftMapping.ts (2 hunks)
- test/IPNFT.t.sol (2 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (4)
subgraph/src/ipnftMapping.ts (2)
78-92: LGTM! Improved function signature formatting.The vertical alignment of parameters enhances code readability while maintaining the original functionality.
Line range hint
1-124: Verify handling of POI-related events.The PR introduces POI verification functionality, but the subgraph mappings don't appear to handle any POI-specific events. This might lead to missing data in the subgraph.
Let's check if there are any POI-related events in the contract that need to be handled:
test/IPNFT.t.sol (1)
267-267: LGTM!The changes to the
amendMetadatafunction calls maintain the same functionality while adjusting the parameters to match the updated interface.Also applies to: 272-272
subgraph/abis/IPNFT.json (1)
229-267: LGTM! Function signature is well-defined.The
mintWithPOIfunction follows the same pattern as the existingmintReservationfunction, with appropriate parameter types and payable modifier for handling minting fees.
| } | ||
| updateIpnftMetadata(ipnft, newUri, event.block.timestamp) | ||
| updateIpnftMetadata(ipnft, newUri, event.block.timestamp) |
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🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Consider adding URI validation before metadata update.
While updateIpnftMetadata handles invalid URIs internally, adding validation before the update would be more efficient and provide clearer error handling.
Consider this improvement:
+ if (!newUri.startsWith('ipfs://')) {
+ log.error('Invalid URI format received in MetadataUpdate for token {}: {}', [
+ event.params._tokenId.toString(),
+ newUri
+ ])
+ return
+ }
updateIpnftMetadata(ipnft, newUri, event.block.timestamp)
ipnft.save()Committable suggestion was skipped due to low confidence.
src/IPNFT.sol
Outdated
| function mintWithPOI(address to, bytes32 poi, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization) | ||
| external | ||
| payable | ||
| whenNotPaused | ||
| returns (uint256) | ||
| { |
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🛠️ Refactor suggestion
Add reentrancy protection to mintWithPOI function
The mintWithPOI function is payable and involves external calls and state changes, which could be susceptible to reentrancy attacks.
To protect against reentrancy, consider using OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable and applying the nonReentrant modifier to the function.
Implement as follows:
+import { ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable } from "@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol";
contract IPNFT is ERC721URIStorageUpgradeable, ERC721BurnableUpgradeable, IReservable, UUPSUpgradeable, OwnableUpgradeable, PausableUpgradeable, ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable {
// ...
function initialize() external initializer {
// ...
+ __ReentrancyGuard_init();
}
function mintWithPOI(address to, bytes32 poi, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization)
external
payable
+ nonReentrant
whenNotPaused
returns (uint256)
{
// ...
}
// ...
}Committable suggestion was skipped due to low confidence.
src/IPNFT.sol
Outdated
| function _handleMint(address to, uint256 tokenId, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization) internal { | ||
| if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) { | ||
| revert MintingFeeTooLow(); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(reservationId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) { | ||
| if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(tokenId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) { | ||
| revert Unauthorized(); | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| delete reservations[reservationId]; | ||
| symbol[reservationId] = _symbol; | ||
| symbol[tokenId] = _symbol; | ||
| mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization); | ||
|
|
||
| _mint(to, reservationId); | ||
| _setTokenURI(reservationId, _tokenURI); | ||
| emit IPNFTMinted(to, reservationId, _tokenURI, _symbol); | ||
| return reservationId; | ||
| _mint(to, tokenId); | ||
| _setTokenURI(tokenId, _tokenURI); | ||
| emit IPNFTMinted(to, tokenId, _tokenURI, _symbol); |
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Potential reentrancy vulnerability in _handleMint function
The _handleMint function makes an external call to mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization) before completing all state changes and emitting events. This could introduce a reentrancy vulnerability if the external contract is untrusted.
To mitigate this risk, consider reordering the operations to follow the checks-effects-interactions pattern. Perform all state changes and emit events before making external calls.
Apply this diff to rearrange the code:
function _handleMint(address to, uint256 tokenId, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization) internal {
if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) {
revert MintingFeeTooLow();
}
if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(tokenId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
+ // State changes
symbol[tokenId] = _symbol;
_mint(to, tokenId);
_setTokenURI(tokenId, _tokenURI);
emit IPNFTMinted(to, tokenId, _tokenURI, _symbol);
+ // External call after state changes
mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization);
}📝 Committable suggestion
‼️ IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation. Thoroughly test & benchmark the code to ensure it meets the requirements.
| function _handleMint(address to, uint256 tokenId, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization) internal { | |
| if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) { | |
| revert MintingFeeTooLow(); | |
| } | |
| if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(reservationId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) { | |
| if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(tokenId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) { | |
| revert Unauthorized(); | |
| } | |
| delete reservations[reservationId]; | |
| symbol[reservationId] = _symbol; | |
| symbol[tokenId] = _symbol; | |
| mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization); | |
| _mint(to, reservationId); | |
| _setTokenURI(reservationId, _tokenURI); | |
| emit IPNFTMinted(to, reservationId, _tokenURI, _symbol); | |
| return reservationId; | |
| _mint(to, tokenId); | |
| _setTokenURI(tokenId, _tokenURI); | |
| emit IPNFTMinted(to, tokenId, _tokenURI, _symbol); | |
| function _handleMint(address to, uint256 tokenId, string calldata _tokenURI, string calldata _symbol, bytes calldata authorization) internal { | |
| if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) { | |
| revert MintingFeeTooLow(); | |
| } | |
| if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(tokenId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) { | |
| revert Unauthorized(); | |
| } | |
| // State changes | |
| symbol[tokenId] = _symbol; | |
| _mint(to, tokenId); | |
| _setTokenURI(tokenId, _tokenURI); | |
| emit IPNFTMinted(to, tokenId, _tokenURI, _symbol); | |
| // External call after state changes | |
| mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization); | |
| } |
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
src/IPNFT.sol (1)
106-116: Enhance documentation for POI hash requirements.While the documentation clearly explains the dual-purpose nature of the function, it would be beneficial to add:
- Format requirements for the POI hash
- Explanation of how POI hashes are generated/validated
- Any constraints or limitations on POI hash values
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src/IPNFT.sol(3 hunks)test/IPNFT.t.sol(2 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- test/IPNFT.t.sol
🔇 Additional comments (2)
src/IPNFT.sol (2)
Line range hint 125-192: Previous reentrancy concern remains valid.
The previous review comment about reentrancy protection is still applicable. The mintReservation function makes external calls (mintAuthorizer.redeem and mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint) before completing state changes.
125-126:
Reconsider POI validation approach.
The current implementation has several potential issues:
- Using
type(uint128).maxas a threshold is arbitrary and could lead to collisions between large reservation IDs and POI hashes - No validation of POI hash structure or format
- As mentioned in previous reviews, POI validation should be handled off-chain by the permissioner/sign-off process
Consider:
- Using a different mechanism to distinguish between reservation IDs and POI hashes
- Moving POI validation entirely off-chain
- If on-chain validation is required, implement proper POI hash format validation
Let's verify the maximum reservation ID currently in use:
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🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (4)
test/IPNFTMintHelper.sol (1)
40-42: Document the POI verification logic and consider using constants.The verification logic uses
type(uint128).maxas a threshold to distinguish POI tokens, but the reasoning behind this approach isn't clear. Consider:
- Adding documentation to explain the POI token ID range strategy
- Using a named constant for better readability
+ /// @notice Threshold for distinguishing POI tokens from regular tokens + uint256 constant POI_TOKEN_THRESHOLD = type(uint128).max; + + /// @notice Verifies if a token ID represents a POI token + /// @dev POI tokens are identified by having an ID greater than uint128.max + /// @param tokenId The token ID to verify + /// @return bool True if the token is a POI token function verifyPoi(uint256 tokenId) public pure returns (bool) { - return tokenId > type(uint128).max; + return tokenId > POI_TOKEN_THRESHOLD; }subgraph/subgraph.yaml (2)
Line range hint
8-11: Critical: Network configuration inconsistency detected.The IPNFT contract remains on
foundrynetwork while all dependent contracts are being moved tomainnet. This configuration mismatch would break the subgraph's ability to index events across contracts.Apply this diff to ensure consistent network configuration:
- kind: ethereum/contract name: IPNFT - network: foundry + network: mainnet source: abi: IPNFT address: "0xe7f1725E7734CE288F8367e1Bb143E90bb3F0512"Also applies to: 62-62, 87-87, 124-124, 170-170, 191-191, 211-211, 243-243
Contract addresses need to be updated for mainnet deployment
The verification confirms that the contract addresses in
subgraph.yamlare indeed from a test environment:
- IPNFT and SchmackoSwap contracts are configured for
network: foundrywith test addresses (0xe7f1725...and0x9fE46736...)- Other contracts are configured for
network: mainnetbut appear to use Hardhat/Foundry deterministic deployment addressesPlease update the following:
- Change all
network: foundrytonetwork: mainnet- Replace test addresses with the actual mainnet deployment addresses for:
- IPNFT contract (
0xe7f1725E7734CE288F8367e1Bb143E90bb3F0512)- SchmackoSwap contract (
0x9fE46736679d2D9a65F0992F2272dE9f3c7fa6e0)- Tokenizer contract (
0xB7f8BC63BbcaD18155201308C8f3540b07f84F5e)- Other contracts that use deterministic deployment addresses
🔗 Analysis chain
Line range hint
10-10: Verify contract addresses for mainnet deployment.Since we're moving to mainnet, please verify that all contract addresses are correct for the production environment. The current addresses appear to be from the test environment (e.g.,
0xe7f1725E7734CE288F8367e1Bb143E90bb3F0512).Let's verify the contract addresses:
Also applies to: 63-65, 88-90, 125-127, 171-173, 192-194, 212-214
Let me gather more context about the deployment environment and contract addresses.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Description: Check if the contract addresses match known patterns for test addresses # Test: Look for addresses that follow Hardhat/Foundry's deterministic deployment pattern rg -i "0xe7f1725|0x5fbdb2315678afecb367f032d93f642f64180aa3|0x8a791620dd6260079bf849dc5567adc3f2fdc318" --type yamlLength of output: 283
Script:
#!/bin/bash # Check the content of subgraph.yaml to understand the deployment context cat subgraph/subgraph.yaml # Look for any deployment-related configuration files fd -e json -e js -e ts -e yaml deployLength of output: 8295
src/IPNFT.sol (1)
209-211: Consider adding a named constant for POI thresholdThe POI verification logic could be more maintainable with a named constant.
+ /// @dev Threshold to distinguish POI hashes from reservation IDs + uint256 constant POI_THRESHOLD = type(uint128).max; + function _verifyPoi(uint256 poi) internal pure returns (bool) { - return poi > type(uint128).max; + return poi > POI_THRESHOLD; }
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📒 Files selected for processing (4)
src/IPNFT.sol(5 hunks)subgraph/subgraph.yaml(7 hunks)test/IPNFT.t.sol(2 hunks)test/IPNFTMintHelper.sol(1 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- test/IPNFT.t.sol
🔇 Additional comments (4)
test/IPNFTMintHelper.sol (1)
40-42: Verify alignment with production code.
Let's verify if this test implementation matches the production code's POI verification logic.
✅ Verification successful
Test implementation correctly matches production code's POI verification logic
The test implementation in IPNFTMintHelper.sol perfectly aligns with the production code in IPNFT.sol. Both implementations verify POI by checking if the value is greater than type(uint128).max. The only difference is that the production code uses an internal function _verifyPoi while the test uses a public function verifyPoi, which is appropriate for testing purposes.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for POI verification logic in production code
echo "Searching for POI verification in contracts..."
rg -t sol "type\(uint128\).max" ./src/
Length of output: 171
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Search for POI verification logic in production code without file type restriction
echo "Searching for POI verification in contracts..."
rg "type\(uint128\).max"
# Also search for any function named verifyPoi
echo -e "\nSearching for verifyPoi function implementations..."
ast-grep --pattern 'function verifyPoi($$$) { $$$ }'
Length of output: 426
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's get more context around the POI verification in IPNFT.sol
echo "Checking POI verification in IPNFT.sol..."
rg -B 2 -A 2 "type\(uint128\).max" src/IPNFT.sol
# Also get the full function implementation context
echo -e "\nSearching for verifyPoi function in IPNFT.sol..."
ast-grep --pattern 'function verifyPoi($$$) $$$'
Length of output: 423
src/IPNFT.sol (3)
106-116: Documentation updates look good!
The updated documentation clearly explains the dual functionality of the mintReservation function, supporting both reservation IDs and POI hashes. The symbolic fee explanation and return value are well documented.
Line range hint 117-124: Add reentrancy protection to mintReservation function
The function is payable and involves external calls, making it potentially vulnerable to reentrancy attacks. Consider implementing OpenZeppelin's ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.
This issue was previously raised in the past reviews. Please refer to the existing comment about adding the ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable contract and nonReentrant modifier.
Line range hint 125-139: Verify POI hash collision prevention
While the POI verification logic is sound, consider the edge case where a POI hash could potentially collide with a valid reservation ID. The current implementation using type(uint128).max as a threshold provides a good separation, but it would be helpful to document this design decision.
✅ Verification successful
POI verification implementation is secure and well-designed
The implementation uses a clear and deterministic boundary between reservation IDs and POI values by utilizing type(uint128).max as a threshold. The POI verification is consistently implemented across both the main contract and test helper:
src/IPNFT.sol: POIs are verified usingpoi > type(uint128).maxtest/IPNFTMintHelper.sol: Same verification logic is mirrored
This design ensures that reservation IDs (≤ uint128.max) and POI values (> uint128.max) occupy distinct ranges, eliminating any possibility of collisions. The implementation is correct and secure.
🏁 Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Check if there are any existing reservations with IDs above uint128.max
rg -l "reservationId.*type\(uint128\).max" .
Length of output: 46
Script:
#!/bin/bash
# Let's check the POI verification implementation and related code
ast-grep --pattern 'function _verifyPoi($_) {
$$$
}'
# Also check for any POI-related constants or thresholds
rg "type\(uint128\)" -A 2 -B 2
Length of output: 525
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Actionable comments posted: 2
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (1)
src/IPNFT.sol (1)
106-116: Enhance documentation for POI security implicationsWhile the documentation explains the dual functionality (reservation ID or POI hash), it should also:
- Clarify the security implications of using POI hashes
- Document the threshold used in
isPoifunction- Explain why
type(uint128).maxwas chosen as the boundary
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📒 Files selected for processing (2)
src/IPNFT.sol(6 hunks)test/IPNFT.t.sol(2 hunks)
🚧 Files skipped from review as they are similar to previous changes (1)
- test/IPNFT.t.sol
🔇 Additional comments (2)
src/IPNFT.sol (2)
Line range hint 125-139: Add input validation and optimize operations order
Several improvements are needed:
- Add validation for the 'to' address to prevent minting to address(0)
- Consider reordering operations to follow checks-effects-interactions pattern:
- Move all checks to the beginning
- Group state changes
- Place external calls last
Apply this diff:
+ if (to == address(0)) {
+ revert ToZeroAddress();
+ }
+
bool _isPoi = isPoi(reservationId);
if (!_isPoi && reservations[reservationId] != _msgSender()) {
revert NotOwningReservation(reservationId);
}
if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) {
revert MintingFeeTooLow();
}
if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(reservationId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
+ // Group state changes
+ symbol[reservationId] = _symbol;
+ _mint(to, reservationId);
+ _setTokenURI(reservationId, _tokenURI);
+
if (!_isPoi) {
delete reservations[reservationId];
}
- symbol[reservationId] = _symbol;
mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization);
-
- _mint(to, reservationId);
- _setTokenURI(reservationId, _tokenURI);
emit IPNFTMinted(to, reservationId, _tokenURI, _symbol);
return reservationId;The previous review comment about adding reentrancy protection is still valid.
Line range hint 196-221: LGTM: Standard implementations look correct
The added standard functions (_authorizeUpgrade, _burn, tokenURI, supportsInterface) are correctly implemented according to their respective interfaces.
uses constant Signed-off-by: stadolf <[email protected]>
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Actionable comments posted: 0
🧹 Outside diff range and nitpick comments (2)
src/IPNFT.sol (2)
47-48: Enhance documentation for MAX_RESERVATION_ID constantThe constant's purpose and implications should be better documented. Consider adding a detailed comment explaining:
- Why uint128.max was chosen as the threshold
- The range allocation between reservation IDs and POI hashes
- /// @dev the highest possible reservation id + /// @dev Defines the boundary between reservation IDs and POI hashes + /// @dev Values <= MAX_RESERVATION_ID are regular reservation IDs + /// @dev Values > MAX_RESERVATION_ID are considered POI hashes + /// @dev Using uint128.max allows for 2^128 reservation IDs and 2^128 POI hashes uint256 private constant MAX_RESERVATION_ID = type(uint128).max;
109-119: Improve documentation clarity for POI vs reservation IDThe documentation should more clearly distinguish between the two minting paths and their implications.
- * Minting the IPNFT can happen either with a reservation id or poi hash (Proof of Idea). - * if the tokenId is a reservationId then it invalidates the reservation. + * @notice Minting can occur through two paths: + * 1. Using a reservation ID: Requires prior reservation and invalidates the reservation after minting + * 2. Using a POI hash: Direct minting with a Proof of Idea hash (value > MAX_RESERVATION_ID)
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src/IPNFT.sol(7 hunks)
🔇 Additional comments (2)
src/IPNFT.sol (2)
Line range hint 128-142: Add reentrancy protection to mintReservation
The function makes external calls and modifies state, making it potentially vulnerable to reentrancy attacks.
The previous review comment about adding ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable is still valid and should be addressed.
Additionally, consider reordering operations to follow checks-effects-interactions:
function mintReservation(...) {
+ if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) {
+ revert MintingFeeTooLow();
+ }
+
bool _isPoi = isPoi(reservationId);
if (!_isPoi && reservations[reservationId] != _msgSender()) {
revert NotOwningReservation(reservationId);
}
- if (msg.value < SYMBOLIC_MINT_FEE) {
- revert MintingFeeTooLow();
- }
+ // State changes
+ if (!_isPoi) {
+ delete reservations[reservationId];
+ }
+ symbol[reservationId] = _symbol;
+ _mint(to, reservationId);
+ _setTokenURI(reservationId, _tokenURI);
+ emit IPNFTMinted(to, reservationId, _tokenURI, _symbol);
+ // External calls
if (!mintAuthorizer.authorizeMint(_msgSender(), to, abi.encode(SignedMintAuthorization(reservationId, _tokenURI, authorization)))) {
revert Unauthorized();
}
- if (!_isPoi) {
- delete reservations[reservationId];
- }
- symbol[reservationId] = _symbol;
mintAuthorizer.redeem(authorization);
- _mint(to, reservationId);
- _setTokenURI(reservationId, _tokenURI);
- emit IPNFTMinted(to, reservationId, _tokenURI, _symbol);
return reservationId;
}212-216: Enhance test coverage for isPoi function
The previous review comment about insufficient test coverage is still valid. Ensure comprehensive testing of:
- Values below MAX_RESERVATION_ID (should return false)
- Edge case at MAX_RESERVATION_ID (should return false)
- Edge case at MAX_RESERVATION_ID + 1 (should return true)
#!/bin/bash
# Description: Verify test coverage for isPoi function
echo "Checking test coverage for isPoi edge cases..."
rg -A 5 "isPoi.*MAX_RESERVATION_ID" "test/"Signed-off-by: Stefan Adolf <[email protected]>
Summary by CodeRabbit
mintReservationfunction for clarity on reservation ID usage.