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delete attack for comparing bloom filter to broadcasted transaction; …
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…fold into II.A

Source: OBPP Network Attack Notes google doc, non-reorganized section.
The Note in this doc says:
> Notes: Daniel suggests removing this one, see GitHub issue
OpenBitcoinPrivacyProject/wallet-ratings#135
> TODO: This looks like a good idea, already captured in criterion for
II.A. Need to move CM23 to that attack or elsewhere.

I moved CM23 to attack II.A and added an example scenario to help
indicate that this scenario falls under that attack now.

Note that this attack was excluded from the reorganized section of the
doc on the basis of deleting it.
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Kristov Atlas committed May 4, 2017
1 parent 8ccf973 commit 8e5a3f2
Showing 1 changed file with 35 additions and 38 deletions.
73 changes: 35 additions & 38 deletions obpp3.hjson
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name: Link addresses belonging to a single user by observing blockchain data correlations leaked by the wallet in the process of obtaining its relevant blockchain data from the network
weight: 0
nonce-id: b3e3946042646148f10905084fa2e00d8344e1a9c1acace5e9d3db2d4b339805,
comment: "Example Scenario: A blockchain data API server receives a request from a client for the UTXO set for xpubXYZ which includes all addresses derived from the xpub, and therefore infers mutual ownership of those addresses."
comments: [
"Example Scenario: A blockchain data API server receives a request from a client for the UTXO set for xpubXYZ which includes all addresses derived from the xpub, and therefore infers mutual ownership of those addresses."
"Example Scenario: A network observer connects to an SPV node in the Bitcoin P2P network and records its Bloom filters and any transactions it broadcasts. The observer compares addresses in the broadcasted transactions to the Bloom filters to determine which transactions and addresses likely belong to that node's wallet."
countermeasures: [{

#Countermeasure 1 of 2
#Countermeasure 1 of 3
numeral: "1"
id: OBPPV3/CM16
description: Obtain relevant blockchain data without making queries to other network participants
Expand All @@ -410,7 +412,7 @@
description: Blockchain data is obtained from a local copy of the blockchain
effectiveness: 1.0 }]}{

#Countermeasure 2 of 2
#Countermeasure 2 of 3
numeral: "2"
id: OBPPV3/CM61
description: Perform multiple queries for blockchain data in a way that makes it difficult to correlate the queries with one another
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -471,6 +473,17 @@
description: The wallet client does not send stateful information in messages that persists between connection contexts
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}]}{

#Countermeasure 3 of 3
numeral: "3"
id: OBPPV3/CM23
description: Route outgoing transactions through a different route than through the peer which is providing relevant blockchain data
effectiveness: 0
criteria: [{
numeral: a
id: OBPPV3/CR31
description: Outgoing transactions are routed through a different entry point into the network than the source of blockchain data
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 2 of 17
numeral: B
name: Link addresses belonging to a single user by observing non-blockchain data correlations to relevant blockchain data queries
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -677,24 +690,8 @@
description: A single query for blockchain data may corerespond to multiple addresses in a user's wallet, but a separate connection context is used for each query
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 7 of 17
#Network Observer Attack 7 of 16
numeral: G
name: Reduce the false positive rate of filters by comparing the transactions sent by a client with the filter they have sent
weight: 0
nonce-id: b6a0a2166b464141545767985b91bc7f3d4588ccf2e289debb156495e66b0c43
countermeasures: [{
numeral: "1"
id: OBPPV3/CM23
description: Route outgoing transactions through a different route than through the peer which is providing relevant blockchain data
effectiveness: 0
criteria: [{
numeral: a
id: OBPPV3/CR31
description: Outgoing transactions are routed through a different entry point into the network than the source of blockchain data
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 8 of 17
numeral: H
name: Link different identities based on a bloom/prefix filter or other query that matches blockchain data associated with multiple identities
weight: 0
nonce-id: 140539e51bfb8cf15674b525c4f10221f6c6a2e505214d026b741d0ae3fcacf3
Expand All @@ -709,8 +706,8 @@
description: Any given network query for blockchain data does not correspond to addresses that belong to different identity containers within the user's wallet
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 9 of 17
numeral: I
#Network Observer Attack 8 of 16
numeral: H
name: Link different identities by observing that the same IP address is sending outgoing transactions associated with multiple identities
weight: 0
nonce-id: 3629b41cec638da990ebdea750f826092fe14bcecb82368c7c122fc0e54dccd6
Expand All @@ -725,8 +722,8 @@
description: Avoids broadcasting outgoing transactions from different identity containers via the same connection context
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 10 of 17
numeral: J
#Network Observer Attack 9 of 16
numeral: I
name: Temporally link transactions to a known IP address via side channel attacks based on wallet behavior
weight: 0
nonce-id: 43100ea35b524b5aaa340230718db1c17e2afe96191f3a2a312c1cff46fbb513
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -754,8 +751,8 @@
description: Wallet avoids leaking information about recipients via an external identity lookup
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 11 of 17
numeral: K
#Network Observer Attack 10 of 16
numeral: J
name: Derive the type of wallet used to create a transaction by passively observing idiosyncrasies in the interactive behaviour of the wallet
weight: 0
nonce-id: 4fdc28522ebe1933607a7714e280ce75284f0641266360bc0df9d19c9fd2e7ab
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -793,8 +790,8 @@
description: The wallet avoids observably connecting to a known endpoint, such as a wallet provider's domain
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 12 of 17
numeral: L
#Network Observer Attack 11 of 16
numeral: K
name: Correlate activity of a specific wallet across different connection sessions by observing idiosyncratic client wallet behavior which acts as a unique fingerprint
weight: 0
nonce-id: 277ec132f4cb4edc1cffc0905bde99fe5d6453f368661ff9aad87d1fca34662a
Expand All @@ -809,8 +806,8 @@
description: The wallet client does not send stateful information in messages that persists between connection contexts
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 13 of 17
numeral: M
#Network Observer Attack 12 of 16
numeral: L
name: Correlate an IP address to a likely transaction participant by monitoring for queries (to a block explorer, etc.) about specific recent transactions
weight: 0
nonce-id: d0148c236ec02d067a222879531b75dab955b292c738ea95a107791076754983
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -842,8 +839,8 @@
description: Blockchain data is queried via probabilistic filters matching a fraction of Bitcoin transactions beyond the intent of the query
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 14 of 17
numeral: N
#Network Observer Attack 13 of 16
numeral: M
name: Perform a transport-level MITM attack on a connection between the wallet and a source of server to obtain PII and/or insert malicious code into the communication between wallet and server
weight: 0
nonce-id: f8aa58958a67fdd52898976a58bd551d3acfcce13d90f288ea907b1a325c9c21
Expand All @@ -864,8 +861,8 @@
description: The wallet client uses a pre-shared symmetric key to authenticate the server
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 15 of 17
numeral: O
#Network Observer Attack 14 of 16
numeral: N
name: Identify an entity as a likely transaction participant by observing out-of-band notifications subsequent to a transaction generated by any participant and/or their wallet provider
weight: 0
nonce-id: 543ff516a3b027ec62e9a50480eb1ccc5376fedbff70b8f5fc5588c7129c9e6d
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -893,8 +890,8 @@
description: Number of clicks to prevent the wallet provider from sending out-of-band notifications to the user about a transaction
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 16 of 17
numeral: P
#Network Observer Attack 15 of 16
numeral: O
name: Determine the change output of a transaction by observing different versions of it broadcast as part of an RBF process
weight: 0
nonce-id: e737524c8112bb0b242823cf10674160ed3538f08a95dd42b64d8f491ac311d9
Expand All @@ -913,8 +910,8 @@
description: When creating new versions of RBF transactions, the client does not modify transaction output values from previous versions
effectiveness: 0 }]}]}{

#Network Observer Attack 17 of 17
numeral: Q
#Network Observer Attack 16 of 16
numeral: P
name: Correlate transactions with out-of-band behavior by recording the time at which transactions enter the network
weight: 0
nonce-id: f62d0ecf74cbb379fcde438a97a52d08eb79b07acde409e47b1dbcf9c814d114
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