Skip to content

Commit

Permalink
Doc Negotiate and caveats
Browse files Browse the repository at this point in the history
Fixes #294

Signed-off-by: slominskir <[email protected]>
  • Loading branch information
slominskir committed Jan 17, 2024
1 parent 796000a commit 7b007fb
Showing 1 changed file with 32 additions and 0 deletions.
32 changes: 32 additions & 0 deletions README
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,6 +8,38 @@ This module has been built as a replacement for the aging mod_auth_kerb.
Its aim is to use only GSSAPI calls and be as much as possible agnostic
of the actual mechanism used.


Negotiate, Client Specific Behavior, and External Clients
---------------------------------------------------------
The mod_auth_gssapi httpd plugin relies on Microsoft's IANA registered
[www-authenticate: Negotiate](https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-authschemes/http-authschemes.xhtml)
auth scheme to provide Kerberos and NTLM authentication to web browsers.
The negotiation process is client driven and the default process is to
attempt Kerberos first, then fall back onto NTLM.
If NTLM is not desired it must be disabled client-side. Many browsers
such as recent versions of Firefox default to disabling NTLM and require
opt-in (regardless of OS). However. many browsers behave differently on
Windows, defer to the Windows Authentication subsystem, and therefore still
use an NTLM fallback per the original Microsoft specification in
[RFC4559](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4559.txt) by default. Browsers which
default to NTLM fallback on Windows include chromium based browsers such as
Chrome and Edge as well as older browsers such as IE.

If NTLM is enabled client side and Kerberos auth fails then the browser will
prompt the user with a username and password dialog that looks similar to an
HTTP Basic auth form, regardless of whether the server is configured to handle
NTLM. This often confuses and frustrates users and admins. It may be
possible to disable NTLM fallback if an admin has control of every user OS and
user browser, but in that scenario (corporate network/intranet) the admin has
presumably correctly configured Kerberos so fallback is unlikely to occur. The
larger issue is if you have an external facing auth server and therefore no
control over all clients some of whom may be on Windows using a browser that
delegates to the Windows Authentication subsystem. Neither Kerberos nor NTLM
are designed to work in a public Internet scenario and therefore using IP-based
request filtering on the auth server to conditionally prompt only internal
managed Kerberos clients (corporate intranet) users with
`www-authenticate: Negotiate` is a reasonable solution.

Dependencies
------------

Expand Down

0 comments on commit 7b007fb

Please sign in to comment.