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BIP APIs
VRO uses two BIP APIs.
Information specific to the individual API can be found the above pages. This page, in addition to providing these links, describes the details of VRO Mutual TLS implementation.
BIP APIs require mTLS. It is necesssary for VRO to use a client certificate signed by a VA recognized Certificate Authority (CA) during https handshake. In addition VRO needs to use a VA recognized CA to validate BIP certificates during https handshake.
Venabi is the VA's new Internal Management System which can be used to manage the PKI certificates. Within VRO Kubernetes cluster the process is further simplified and it is possible to generate the certificates within one of VRO Kubernetes namespaces. The client certificates that are being used currently by VRO has been generated using these instructions.
The certificates tls.key
, tls.crt
, and va.crt
has been generated in va-abd-rrd-dev
namespace and can be found in va-abd-rrd-dev-va-gov-tls
secrets.
The private key tls.key
is not encrypted so there are no passwords needed for steps described later in this document.
Details for tls.crt
can be displayed using
openssl x509 -in tls.crt -text -noout
The certificate tls.crt
expires in January 6th, 2024.
The certificate tls.crt
contains both the client public key and an intermediate CA. Only the client public key is used and will be referred as tls_bip.crt
.
The certificate va.crt
is not currently used.
Based on discussions with LHDI support, the considerations of production use of certificates generated in va-abd-rrd-dev
are
- Are there any concerns with using the same cert for both dev and prod environments?
- Are there any concerns with management across the different environments? For example, if you're using auto cert renewal what does the process look like for grabbing the new cert and copying to prod vs using two different certs and having each managed/automatically updated?
At this time we do not have these concerns so we are using the same certificates in prodtest
and prod
.
As discussed later in this document we do not yet know a way to use these certificates directly in the Java code and there are manual steps to make them usable. More discussions are needed with LHDI around the process on how to update them.
- Should we switch to auto cert renewal? What is the trigger to perform manual steps if switch is made?
- Should LHDI make these certificates available to containers without additional steps?
- Can we forego container level https and move that complexity to API Gateway so that it is managed by LHDI?
At this time cert renewal is manual and steps in this document should be followed. We have time until January 6th, 2024 to make improvement.
During VRO implementation of mTLS we were not successful using the VA CA public keys in va.crt
and tls.crt
.
Instead we downloaded the public keys that were used by BIP APIs from Chrome on a GFE:
- Open Chrome on your GFE
- Open one of the end points in BIP Claims API or BIP Claim Evidence API. If you use a
GET
end point you should typically get ajwt
missing error - Once you get the error click on the
lock
(View site information) in the url bar to bring up a pop-up window - Select "Connection is secure" menu item to bring up a second pop-up window. From this pop-up you can select "Certificate is valid" to bring up the "Certificate viewer".
- Goto "Details" tab, select the certificate for root CA and "Export". Repeat for the intermediate CA
Two certificates downloaded are
- VA-Internal-S2-RCA1-v1.crt (root)
- VA-Internal-S2-ICA4.crt (intermediate)
These public keys are concatenated in a file named va_all.crt
for later use.
We have not retried to use the VA CA public keys in va.crt
and tls.crt
after we successfully used va_all.crt
. This should be revisited in the future since it is possible that the steps we eventually ended up with could be succesful for public keys in va.crt
and tls.crt
as well.
As of now we do not know a simple way to consume the certificates tls.key
, tls_bip.crt
, and va_all.crt
directly in the Java code to utilize them in https
calls. Java uses either JKS files or PKCS #12 files. Since PKCS #12 files are not Java specific, we prefer them over JKS files in VRO.
To generate the PKCS #12 file keystore.p12
for client certificates we use openssl
openssl pkcs12 -export -in tls_bip.crt -out keystore.p12 -name keystore -nodes -inkey tls.key
This commands asks for an "export password". This password is to be recorded as it needs to be later used as a secret.
To generate the PKCS #12 file truststore.p12
for VA CA certificates we use keytool
keytool -import -file va_all.crt -alias all_cas -keystore truststore.p12
This command asks for a "keystore password". For simplicity VRO uses the same the value of "export password".
It should be possible either to use keystore
or openssl
exclusively here. But these PKCS #12 files worked and we did not try either route any further.
VRO uses three environment variables to store the content of the [PKCS #12] files and the "export password".
BIP_KEYSTORE
BIP_TRUSTSTORE
BIP_PASSWORD
Since PKCS #12 files are binary we convert them to Base 64 using openssl
openssl base64 -in keystore.p12 -out keystore.b64
openssl base64 -in truststore.p12 -out truststore.b64
What is stored in the environment variables BIP_KEYSTORE
and BIP_TRUSTSTORE
are the content of the Base 64 files.
In our environments these environment variables are made available to the app
container using the following secrets
- bip.bipKeystore
- bip.bipTruststore
- bip.bipPassword
In summary the manual steps to make the certificates available to the Java code are
- Convert certificates to PKCS #12 files
- Convert PKCS #12 files to Base 64 files
- Store content of the Base 64 files in Kubernetes secrets
- Restart the pod to make secret changes effective
If https
handshake implementation remains in the Java code (as opposed to say moved to API Gateway) these manual steps need to be automated if certificate renewal is automated.
Java uses Keystore objects to store certificate information in PKCS #12 files. VRO
- Reads in the content of the PKCS #12 files and the password from the environment variables
BIP_KEYSTORE
,BIP_TRUSTSTORE
, andBIP_PASSWORD
through application.yml - Converts Base 64 content to binary content
- Creates the keystore and trusstore objects as Keystore instances from the binary content and the password
- Creates a custom RestTemplate bean that can be used to make the
https
requests
The properties in application.yml that corresponds to the environment variables are
-
keystore
forBIP_KEYSTORE
-
truststore
forBIP_TRUSTSTORE
-
truststore_password
forBIP_PASSWORD
The RestTemplate bean that is used to make the https
requests is implemented in BipApiConfig. This file also includes the generation of the Keystore objects from the application.yml properties. This RestTemplate bean is autowired in the rest of the code using the Qualifier bipCERestTemplate
.
Validation of the certificates using the Java code has been problematic since the BIP APIs are not available outside of VA Firewall
- Our GFE's typically do not have Java installed
- Extra permissions are necessary to install and maintain Java on the GFE's
- Additional security features in GFE's makes it difficult to make https calls from Java
curl
has been an invaluable tool to test the validity of the certificates. In principle it should be possible to run curl
in your GFE but running it from the app
container in one of our environment was easier. We copied the certificates tls.key
, tls_bip.crt
, and va_all.crt
to the container using cat <<EOF
and copy&paste in the /tmp
directory. You should be able to use kubectl cp
with enough permissions. Once the files are in the container you can run
curl -X POST <https://......> --cacert va_all.crt --cert tls_bip.crt --key tls.key --verbose
To see the https
handshake to verify the validity of the certificates. The request can be made to any end point of interest.