Asuswrt-Configs-Deobfuscator

Tool to deobfuscate asuswrt configs files

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Usage examples

Info

./awrtconf.py info -i Settings_DSL-N55U.CFG

Dump

./awrtconf.py dump -i Settings_DSL-N55U.CFG -o Settings_DSL-N55U.json

The dump is in json format, do NOT modify the PROFILE value.

Pack

./awrtconf.py pack -i Settings_DSL-N55U.json -o Settings_DSL-N55U_new.CFG

Pack forcing plaintext

./awrtconf.py pack -i Settings_DSL-N55U.json -o Settings_DSL-N55U_plain.CFG -p

All firmwares support the plaintext file for restoring, so you can backup, dump, edit and then pack as plaintext to avoid algorithm bugs.

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Header structure

The header is 8 bytes long and it's in little endian format

Plaintext CFG:

Size (byte)	Type	Name	Comment
4	Char array	Profile	Profile name: HDR1
4	Unsigned Int	Body Size	Aligned to next KB (e.g. 31744 (0x00007c00))

Obfuscated CFG:

Size (byte)	Type	Profile	Comment
4	Char array	Profile	Profile name: HDR2 or N55U or AC55U
3	Unsigned Int	Body size	Aligned to next KB (e.g. 31744 (0x00007c00))
1	Unsigned Int	Randkey	Random number in interval [0, 29], used to obfuscate the file body

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Obfuscation Algorithm

The body of the config file is the nvram content obfuscated with a weak and bugged algorithm.

Pseudocode

Save backup:

For each byte of the nvram:

if byte = 0x00
	byte <- 0xFD or 0xFE or 0xFF
else
	byte <- 0xFF + randkey - byte

Restore backup:

For each byte of CFG file:

if byte = 0xFD or 0xFE or 0xFF
	byte <- 0x00
else
	byte <- 0xFF + randkey - byte;

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Algorithm bugs

Byte overflow

All bytes with a value less than randkey may be lost.

Example:

If the randkey is 18 (0x12) and we have a Line Feed char 0x0A (10) in the nvram:

0xFF + 0x12 - 0x0A -> 0x0107 (byte overflow)
255  +  18  -  10  ->  263

Which become 0x07 (7) when written to CFG file as single byte.

If now we try to restore the backup, when the algorithm try to deobfuscate 0x07:

0xFF + 0x12 - 0x07 -> 0x010A
255  +  18  -  7   ->  266

We need to subtract 0x0100 (256) to get back 0x0A (10)

This is the why in my tool I added this condition:

if byte < randkey:
  byte <- 0xFF + randkey - byte - 0x0100

Null Byte collision

All bytes with a value equal to:

• randkey
• randkey + 1
• randkey + 2

are lost.

This is due to the fact that the algorithm randomly writes:

• 0xFF (255)
• 0xFE (254)
• 0xFD (253)

when there is a Null Byte (0x00) to obfuscate and can generate a collision with other values based on the randkey.

Example:

If the randkey is 0x09, when the algorithm tries to obfuscate a:

Char Name	Escape	ASCII hex	Obfuscation
Horizontal Tab	\t	0x09	0xFF + 0x09 - 0x09 -> 0xFF (collides with 0x00)
Line Feed	\n	0x0A	0xFF + 0x09 - 0x0A -> 0xFE (collides with 0x00)
Vertical Tab		0x0B	0xFF + 0x09 - 0x0B -> 0xFD (collides with 0x00)

When the algorithm tries to deobfuscate the CFG file, it can't distinguish a Null Byte from an Horizontal Tab, Line Feed or Vertial Tab due to this part of the algorithm:

if byte = 0xFD or 0xFE or 0xFF
	byte = 0x00
...

So we have lost 3 bytes.

There is no way to completely fix this collision.

I can only advice to remake the backup until you get a randkey less than 5 (0x05) or greater than 13 (0x0D).

The best value for randkey is 0x00, because due to collision with 0x00, we only lose 0x01 and 0x02, so only 2 values instead of 3 are lost, and since they are not printable chars they are not often used.

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Reference

ASUS Source Code