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Add CeTAS report - Enhancing the Cyber Resilience of Offshore Wind
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content/Reports/Enhancing the Cyber Resilience of Offshore Wind/_index.md
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title: "Enhancing the Cyber Resilience of Offshore Wind" | ||
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[Read the article here](https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/publications/enhancing-cyber-resilience-offshore-wind) | ||
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# Executive Summary | ||
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This Research Report explores how the resilience of offshore wind farms could be | ||
reinforced by artificial intelligence (AI) and intelligent automation, and what actions | ||
policymakers and industry should take to enhance the cybersecurity of offshore wind. The | ||
findings are the result of a collaborative project between The Alan Turing Institute’s CETaS | ||
and Data-Centric Engineering (DCE) programme, which was funded by the Lloyd’s Register | ||
Foundation. | ||
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**Cyberattacks directly or indirectly affecting offshore wind are happening already** with | ||
companies like Enercon, Vestas, Nordex and Deutsche Windtechnik reporting malware and | ||
ransomware attacks. On the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the cyberattack on ViaSat | ||
satellite communications affected space-based assets engaged for command and control of | ||
Enercon’s wind turbines in Germany, leading to the loss of remote monitoring access to | ||
more than 5,800 wind turbines. With plans to significantly scale offshore wind capacity in | ||
the UK, resilience to similar cyberattacks must be reinforced. | ||
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**Some areas in the cyber-physical infrastructure require more attention from a security | ||
perspective because they could lead to cascading damage.** This includes areas where | ||
the grid integrates new and legacy offshore wind infrastructure, the control centre, | ||
intersections with external actors along the offshore wind supply chain and points of | ||
integration with the Internet. | ||
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**Harnessing AI and intelligent automation will reinforce the resilience of offshore wind if | ||
swift action is taken** by government and industry. The AI and intelligent automation | ||
applications identified as the most promising in this report were: anomaly-based intrusion | ||
detection systems (IDS), anomaly detection, intrusion protection systems (IPS), and | ||
hardening and predictive maintenance. While AI and intelligent automation could be | ||
introduced to protect access points that result in the most cascading damage, there are | ||
systemic, supply chain and physical risks which also need to be mitigated. There is an | ||
opportunity to integrate systems that enhance security in the design and construction of | ||
offshore wind systems before offshore wind infrastructure projects are completed. | ||
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**Bolstering resilience requires a radical overhaul of systems-engineering practices | ||
towards resilience-based engineering and a range of systemic changes** to wind industry | ||
operations, regulation, intelligence sharing and research. Offshore wind design and | ||
engineering choices can explore increasing heterogeneity in systems designs within a wind | ||
fleet, as well as increased network segmentation to prevent cascading damage when one | ||
turbine faces an attack. | ||
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Organisational emergency response plans, cross-border intelligence sharing, and security response protocols are also required. | ||
This report proposes mitigative actions to address the main resilience challenges, which are | ||
summarised in Table 1 within the executive summary. The rationale and promising practice informing these | ||
recommendations are presented in Section 4 of the report. |