Sandwich-Resistant Automated Market Maker (Sr-AMM) with dynamic fees. This combination should address both MEV issues and help mitigate LVR(DLMM). Here's a conceptual design:
- Sr-AMM Core Mechanism:
- Implement the Sr-AMM design as described in the "Sandwich-Resistant AMM" document:
- Operate on slot windows (e.g., 4 slots on Solana, 1 on Ethereum).
- Within a slot window, buys increase the offer price but keep the bid price constant.
- Sells decrease the offer price but keep the bid price constant.
- Reset the state to the equivalent xy=k state at the beginning of each slot window.
- Implement the Sr-AMM design as described in the "Sandwich-Resistant AMM" document:
- Dynamic Fee Structure:
- Implement a fee model that adjusts based on market conditions:
- Base fee: Start with a low base fee (e.g., 0.05%).
- Volatility adjustment: Increase fees during high volatility periods.
- Volume adjustment: Adjust fees based on recent trading volume.
- Liquidity depth adjustment: Higher fees when liquidity is thin.
- Implement a fee model that adjusts based on market conditions:
- Fee Calculation Algorithm:
- Fee = BaseFee + VolatilityFactor + VolumeFactor + LiquidityFactor
- VolatilityFactor = f(price change over last N blocks)
- VolumeFactor = g(trading volume over last M blocks)
- LiquidityFactor = h(current liquidity depth)
- Where f, g, and h are carefully calibrated functions.
- Fee Update Mechanism:
- Update fees at the beginning of each slot window.
- Implement a maximum fee change per update to prevent drastic swings.
- Use a moving average for smoother transitions.
- Price Oracle Integration:
- Use Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) to smooth out short-term fluctuations.(needed?)
- Liquidity Provider Incentives:
- Distribute a portion of the collected fees to LPs based on their share of the pool.
- Implement a bonus structure for LPs who maintain their positions during high-volatility periods.
- MEV Mitigation:
- Leverage the Sr-AMM design to prevent atomic sandwich attacks.
- Implement a minimum time delay between trades from the same address to further deter MEV.
- Gas Optimization:
- Optimize the fee calculation and update process to minimize gas costs.
- Consider implementing batch updates for multiple pools if applicable.
- User Interface:
- Provide clear, real-time information about current fees and how they're calculated.
- Offer predictive tools to help users estimate fees for upcoming trades.
- Governance and Parameter Adjustment: ## I don't know why this is important but my co-founder claude thinks it is
- Allow for community governance to adjust key parameters like BaseFee or the functions f, g, and h.
- Implement a timelock for parameter changes to ensure transparency.
- Safety Measures: # will see how Meteora does theirs but this what I thought of
- Create a fee cap to prevent potential exploitation of the dynamic fee system. Implementation Goals:
- Carefully test the interaction between the Sr-AMM mechanism and the dynamic fee structure.
- Ensure that the fee calculation is deterministic and can be predicted by users before they submit transactions.
- Consider the impact of the slot window reset on the dynamic fee calculation.
- Optimize the code to ensure that the added complexity doesn't significantly increase gas costs or introduce vulnerabilities. This design combines the MEV resistance of the Sr-AMM with the adaptability of dynamic fees, potentially creating a more efficient and fair trading environment. The dynamic fees should help address LVR by adjusting to market conditions, while the Sr-AMM structure mitigates sandwich attacks and other forms of MEV.