Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

Clarify: Transaction selection power-law distribution #10

Open
rphmeier opened this issue Dec 6, 2017 · 0 comments
Open

Clarify: Transaction selection power-law distribution #10

rphmeier opened this issue Dec 6, 2017 · 0 comments

Comments

@rphmeier
Copy link
Contributor

rphmeier commented Dec 6, 2017

Quoting from the spec

CONSIDER: Allocating a large CSPRNG subset of validators (maybe 33% + 1) to elect transactions. The subset is ordered with a power-law distribution of transaction allocation. Those allocated greater number of transactions also take a higher priority (and effectively render moot the lower-order validators), meaning that most of the time the first few entrants is enough to get consensus of the transaction set. In the case of a malfunctioning node, the lower-order validators acting in aggregate allow important (e.g. Complaint) transactions to make their way into the block.

Since the transactions need to be included on the relay chain anyway, they have to be subject to some kind of BFT consensus upon inclusion in a relay chain proposal (Tendermint, Aura, PBFT, HoneyBadgerBFT, ...), either leader-based or leader-less.

Is this a way to propagate transactions or to put forward proposals to a leader-less BFT?

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

No branches or pull requests

1 participant