From d19231a719b265ea4812fbaf4dedeabfc8bf5a81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Martin Stancsics <martin.stancsics@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2024 13:08:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add intro and conclusions to chapter 1

---
 src/presentation/defense.qmd | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)

diff --git a/src/presentation/defense.qmd b/src/presentation/defense.qmd
index 0128362..72f499b 100644
--- a/src/presentation/defense.qmd
+++ b/src/presentation/defense.qmd
@@ -209,9 +209,43 @@ The value of being indispensable
 
 ## Motivation
 
+::: {.fragment}
+- Using cooperative game theory to **model bargaining**
+  - Has precedents in labor and IO literature
+  - General solution concepts are **flexible** but often **not very tractable**
+:::
+
+::: {.fragment}
+- Focus on **one indispensable player / many small players**
+  - Economically **relevant**
+  - Even general solution concepts can be **tractable** in this case
+:::
+
+::: {.fragment}
+- **Generalize** existing results
+  - Use **random order values** instead of the Shapley value or weighted values
+  - **Relax** the **indispensable player** assumption
+  - New results for **heterogeneous small players**
+:::
+
 
 ## Literature
 
+::: {.fragment}
+- **Oceanic games** (theoretical)
+  - Focus on fundamental questions, such as existence and uniqueness
+  - E.g., @milnor1978values, @hart1973values, **@fogelman1980asymptotic**
+  - This paper focuses on a more specific setting to derive more concrete results
+:::
+
+::: {.fragment}
+- **IO and labor economics** (applied)
+  - Intermediation, vertical integration, multi-sided markets, wage bargaining
+  - Examples of oceanic games: **@stole1996intra**, @levy1997individual
+  - This paper generalizes those results in a more abstract setting
+  - An example application is based on @armstrong2006competition
+:::
+
 
 ## Simplest model
 
@@ -712,6 +746,25 @@ Weighted value with **$\lambda_1 < \lambda_2$**
 ::::
 
 
+## Conclusion
+
+::: {.fragment}
+- Provide a **tool-kit** for modeling **bargaining** in settings with one (few) **central player**(s) and many small ones
+  - Use **random order values as a general framework**
+  - **Relax** the **indispensable player** assumption
+  - **Generalize** existing results for the **heterogeneous small player case**
+  - Simple example application to two-sided markets (omitted here)
+:::
+
+::: {.fragment}
+- Random order values are a **convenient tool** for modeling bargaining
+  - **Analytically tractable**
+  - More **flexible** than the Shapley value or the we
+  - **Sensible** in terms of comparative statics
+:::
+
+
+
 <!-- CHAPTER 2 -->
 # Chapter 2 – Application
 Hybrid platforms and bargaining power