- Rich & Steven
- The goal: How can you manifest value from the token ownership?
- In the voting structure or in a liquidity pool (store of value like Dai)
- In theory, there should be a deluge of proposals that will need to be voted on regularly.
- Continuous approval is part of executive vote
- Only want to keep your MKR in your wallet when you don’t have the liquidity preference for MKR -> Dai or if the voting structure doesn’t align with your security preference
Will retail users be less likely to lock up their position long term in comparison to a larger institutional investor?
- "Will a new proposal increase the supply of Dai?"
- Generally both should be incentivized to seek increased MKR value
- This is based on the assumption that any proposal can pass
- All proposals will need to be thoroughly vetted to make sure it fits within the systems’ objectives
- This is the first system where you are able to take initiative into your own hands
- We can’t go blame the board of directors or management if something goes wrong
- When considering an executive vote, we should be well past the tipping point of consideration as it has already passed a governance vote
- If there is still contention at the time of the executive vote, then we should let it go
- On the governance vote, it could be much more fluid
- The debt ceiling would be moved to 0
- Whatever is left in the system can only be unwound
- If we want to have similar risk per collateral then we need to identify what parameters we can hold constant
- At a full outstanding debt ceiling the expectation would be the portfolio is balanced
- The risk teams can incentivize CDP creation with specific collateral types through stability fee
- We don’t know which collateral type will hit its debt ceiling first —> leads to new question.. do we raise just that collateral ceiling?
- Constantly need to reevaluate the portfolio makeup
- If we only adjust the one ceiling it will overweight that collateral type in the portfolio
- Keep in mind, the debt ceiling is built on the liquidity profile of the collateral and considering the makeup of the whole portfolio
- Very difficultly
- Battleship metaphor —> see Risk #10, What are the responsibilities of the Foundation vs MakerDAO?
- Some will be MKR holders, some will be incentivized by MKR holders but not holders themselves
- Will depend on what MKR holders desire out of the governance system
- Need lots of points of view to leverage “the wisdom of the crowd"
- When creating any portfolio we want to consider the std dev of the entire portfolio
- Marginal value at risk, provisional value at risk
- We have to either wait for orthogonal collateral types to become available or work with small debt ceilings to reduce the overall risk