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draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering-01.txt
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draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering-01.txt
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Operational Security Capabilities for F. Gont
IP Network Infrastructure (opsec) UTN/FRH
Internet-Draft R. Atkinson
Intended status: BCP Consultant
Expires: October 29, 2011 April 27, 2011
IP Options Filtering Recommendations
draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering-01.txt
Abstract
This document document provides advice on the filtering of packets
based on the IP options they contain. Additionally, it discusses the
operational and interoperability implications of such filtering.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 29, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Gont & Atkinson Expires October 29, 2011 [Page 1]
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. IP Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Processing requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Advice on handling of specific IP Options . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. End of Option List (Type = 0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 7
4.1.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. No Operation (Type = 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 7
4.2.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) (Type = 131) . . . . 7
4.3.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 9
4.3.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) (Type = 137) . . . . 9
4.4.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 9
4.4.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5. Record Route (Type = 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 10
4.5.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6. Stream Identifier (Type = 136) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.6.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.6.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 11
4.6.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7. Internet Timestamp (Type = 68) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.7.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 12
4.7.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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4.8. Router Alert (Type = 148) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.8.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 12
4.8.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.9. Probe MTU (Type = 11) (obsolete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.9.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.9.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.9.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.9.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 13
4.9.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.10. Reply MTU (Type = 12) (obsolete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.10.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.10.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.10.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.10.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 14
4.10.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.11. Traceroute (Type = 82) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.11.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.11.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.11.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.11.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 14
4.11.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.12. DoD Basic Security Option (Type = 130) . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.12.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.12.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.12.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.12.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 15
4.12.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.13. DoD Extended Security Option (Type = 133) . . . . . . . . 16
4.13.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.13.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.13.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.13.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 16
4.13.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.14. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) (Type = 134) . . . . 17
4.14.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.14.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.14.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.14.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 17
4.14.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.15. Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery (Type = 149) . 18
4.15.1. Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.15.2. Option specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.15.3. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.15.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked . . . . 18
4.15.5. Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Changes from previous versions of the draft (to
be removed by the RFC Editor before publishing
this document as an RFC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.1. Changes introduced in
draft-gont-opsec-ip-options-filtering-01 . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Gont & Atkinson Expires October 29, 2011 [Page 4]
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1. Introduction
This document document provides advice on the filtering of IP Options
within IPv4 headers. Various protocols may use IP Options to some
extent, therefore the filtering of such options may have implications
on proper functioning of the protocol. As such, this document
attempts to discuss the operational and interoperability implications
of such filtering. Additionaly, this document will outline what a
network operator might do in a typical enterprise or Service Provider
environment.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. IP Options
IP options allow for the extension of the Internet Protocol
There are two cases for the format of an option:
o Case 1: A single byte of option-type.
o Case 2: An option-type byte, an option-length byte, and the actual
option-data bytes.
In the Case 2, the option-length byte counts the option-type byte and
the option-length byte, as well as the actual option-data bytes.
All current and future options except "End of Option List" (Type = 0)
and "No Operation" (Type = 1), are of Class 2.
The option-type has three fields:
o 1 bit: copied flag.
o 2 bits: option class.
o 5 bits: option number.
The copied flag indicates whether this option should be copied to all
fragments in the event the packet carrying it needs to be fragmented:
o 0 = not copied.
o 1 = copied.
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The values for the option class are:
o 0 = control.
o 1 = reserved for future use.
o 2 = debugging and measurement.
o 3 = reserved for future use.
This format allows for the creation of new options for the extension
of the Internet Protocol (IP).
Finally, the option number identifies the syntax of the rest of the
option.
[IANA2006b] contains the list of the currently assigned IP option
numbers.
3. Processing requirements
Router manufacturers tend to do IP option processing on the main
processor, rather than on line cards. Unless special care is taken,
this represents Denial of Service (DoS) risk, as there is potential
for overwhelming the router with option processing.
The following sections contain a description of each of the IP
options that have so far been specified, a discussion of possible
interoperability implications if packets containing such options are
filtered, and specific advice on whether to filter packets containing
these options in a typical enterprise or Service Provider
environment.
4. Advice on handling of specific IP Options
4.1. End of Option List (Type = 0)
4.1.1. Uses
This option is used to indicate the "end of options" in those cases
in which the end of options would not coincide with the end of the
Internet Protocol Header.
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4.1.2. Option specification
Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.1.3. Threats
No security issues are known for this option, other than the general
security implications of IP options discussed in Section 2.
4.1.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
Packets containing any IP options are likely to include an End of
Option List. Therefore, if packets containing this option are
filtered, it is very likely that legitimate traffic is filtered.
4.1.5. Advice
Do not filter packets containing this option.
4.2. No Operation (Type = 1)
4.2.1. Uses
The no-operation option is basically meant to allow the sending
system to align subsequent options in, for example, 32-bit
boundaries.
4.2.2. Option specification
Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.2.3. Threats
No security issues are known for this option, other than the general
security implications of IP options discussed in Section 2.
4.2.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
4.2.5. Advice
Do not filter packets containing this option.
4.3. Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR) (Type = 131)
RFC 791 states that this option should appear, at most, once in a
given packet. Thus, if a packet contains more than one LSRR option,
it should be dropped, and this event should be logged (e.g., a
counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).
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Additionally, packets containing a combination of LSRR and SSRR
options should be dropped, and this event should be logged (e.g., a
counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).
4.3.1. Uses
This option lets the originating system specify a number of
intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the
destination host. Additionally, the route followed by the packet is
recorded in the option. The receiving host (end-system) must use the
reverse of the path contained in the received LSRR option.
The LSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems.
Some ISP (Internet Service Provider) peering agreements require
support for this option in the routers within the peer of the ISP.
4.3.2. Option specification
Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.3.3. Threats
The LSRR option has well-known security implications. Among other
things, the option can be used to:
o Bypass firewall rules
o Reach otherwise unreachable internet systems
o Establish TCP connections in a stealthy way
o Learn about the topology of a network
o Perform bandwidth-exhaustion attacks
Of these attack vectors, the one that has probably received least
attention is the use of the LSRR option to perform bandwidth
exhaustion attacks. The LSRR option can be used as an amplification
method for performing bandwidth-exhaustion attacks, as an attacker
could make a packet bounce multiple times between a number of systems
by carefully crafting an LSRR option.
This is the IPv4-version of the IPv6 amplification attack that was
widely publicized in 2007 [Biondi2007]. The only difference is
that the maximum length of the IPv4 header (and hence the LSRR
option) limits the amplification factor when compared to the IPv6
counter-part.
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4.3.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the LSRR option
(such as ping or traceroute) would break. Nevertheless, it hould be
noted that it is virtually impossible to use such techniques due to
widespread filtering of the LSRR option.
4.3.5. Advice
All systems should, by default, drop IP packets that contain an LSRR
option.
4.4. Strict Source and Record Route (SSRR) (Type = 137)
4.4.1. Uses
This option allows the originating system to specify a number of
intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the
destination host. Additionally, the route followed by the packet is
recorded in the option, and the destination host (end-system) must
use the reverse of the path contained in the received SSRR option.
This option is similar to the Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR)
option, with the only difference that in the case of SSRR, the route
specified in the option is the exact route the packet must take
(i.e., no other intervening routers are allowed to be in the route).
The SSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems.
Some ISP (Internet Service Provider) peering agreements require
support for this option in the routers within the peer of the ISP.
4.4.2. Option specification
Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.4.3. Threats
The SSRR option has the same security implications as the LSRR
option. Please refer to Section 4.3 for a discussion of such
security implications.
4.4.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the SSRR option
(such as ping or traceroute) would break. Nevertheless, it hould be
noted that it is virtually impossible to use such techniques due to
widespread filtering of the SSRR option.
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4.4.5. Advice
All systems should, by default, drop IP packets that contain an SSRR
option.
4.5. Record Route (Type = 7)
4.5.1. Uses
This option provides a means to record the route that a given packet
follows.
4.5.2. Option specification
Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.5.3. Threats
This option can be exploited to map the topology of a network.
However, the limited space in the IP header limits the usefulness of
this option for that purpose.
4.5.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the RR option
(such as ping with the RR option) would break. Nevertheless, it
hould be noted that it is virtually impossible to use such techniques
due to widespread filtering of the RR option.
4.5.5. Advice
Drop IP packets that contain a Record Route option.
4.6. Stream Identifier (Type = 136)
The Stream Identifier option originally provided a means for the 16-
bit SATNET stream Identifier to be carried through networks that did
not support the stream concept.
However, as stated by Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 [RFC1812], this
option is obsolete. Therefore, it must be ignored by the processing
systems.
In the case of legacy systems still using this option, the length
field of the option should be checked to be 4. If the option does
not pass this check, it should be dropped, and this event should be
logged (e.g., a counter could be incremented to reflect the packet
drop).
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RFC 791 states that this option appears at most once in a given
datagram. Therefore, if a packet contains more than one instance of
this option, it should be dropped, and this event should be logged
(e.g., a counter could be incremented to reflect the packet drop).
4.6.1. Uses
4.6.2. Option specification
Specified in RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.6.3. Threats
TBD
4.6.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
None.
4.6.5. Advice
Filter IP packets that contain a Stream Identifier option.
4.7. Internet Timestamp (Type = 68)
4.7.1. Uses
This option provides a means for recording the time at which each
system processed this datagram.
4.7.2. Option specification
Specified by RFC 791 [RFC0791].
4.7.3. Threats
The timestamp option has a number of security implications. Among
them are:
o It allows an attacker to obtain the current time of the systems
that process the packet, which the attacker may find useful in a
number of scenarios.
o It may be used to map the network topology, in a similar way to
the IP Record Route option.
o It may be used to fingerprint the operating system in use by a
system processing the datagram.
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o It may be used to fingerprint physical devices, by analyzing the
clock skew.
[Kohno2005] describes a technique for fingerprinting devices by
measuring the clock skew. It exploits, among other things, the
timestamps that can be obtained by means of the ICMP timestamp
request messages [RFC0791]. However, the same fingerprinting method
could be implemented with the aid of the Internet Timestamp option.
4.7.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
No security issues are known for this option, other than the general
security implications of IP options discussed in Section 2.
4.7.5. Advice
Filter IP packets that contain an Internet Timestamp option.
4.8. Router Alert (Type = 148)
4.8.1. Uses
The Router Alert option has the semantic "routers should examine this
packet more closely, if they participate in the functionality denoted
by the Value of the option".
4.8.2. Option specification
The Router Alert option is defined in RFC 2113 [RFC2113] and later
updates to it have been clarified by RFC 5350 [RFC5350]. It contains
a 16-bit Value governed by an IANA registry (see [RFC5350]).
4.8.3. Threats
The security implications of the Router Alert option have been
discussed in detail in
[I-D.ietf-intarea-router-alert-considerations]. Basically, the
Router Alert option might be exploited to perform a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack by exhausting CPU resources at the processing routers.
4.8.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
Applications that employ the Router Alert option (such as RSVP
[RFC2205]) would break.
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4.8.5. Advice
This option should be allowed only on controlled environments, where
the option can be used safely
([I-D.ietf-intarea-router-alert-considerations] identifies such
environments). In other environments, packets containing this option
should be dropped.
4.9. Probe MTU (Type = 11) (obsolete)
4.9.1. Uses
This option originally provided a mechanism to discover the Path-MTU.
It has been declared obsolete.
4.9.2. Option specification
This option was defined in RFC 1063 [RFC1063]. This option is
obsolete.
4.9.3. Threats
None
4.9.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
None
4.9.5. Advice
Filter IP packets that contain a Probe MTU option.
4.10. Reply MTU (Type = 12) (obsolete)
4.10.1. Uses
This option and originally provided a mechanism to discover the Path-
MTU. It is now obsolete.
4.10.2. Option specification
This option was originally specified by RFC 1063 [RFC1063], and is
now obsolete.
4.10.3. Threats
None.
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4.10.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
None
4.10.5. Advice
Filter IP packets that contain a Reply MTU option.
4.11. Traceroute (Type = 82)
4.11.1. Uses
This option originally provided a mechanism to trace the path to a
host.
4.11.2. Option specification
This option was originally specified by RFC 1393 [RFC1393]. It has
been declared obsolete.
4.11.3. Threats
None
4.11.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
None
4.11.5. Advice
Filter IP packets that contain a Traceroute option.
4.12. DoD Basic Security Option (Type = 130)
4.12.1. Uses
This option is used by Multi-Level-Secure (MLS) end-systems and
intermediate systems in specific environments to [RFC1108]:
o Transmit from source to destination in a network standard
representation the common security labels required by computer
security models [Landwehr81],
o Validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from the
source and delivery to the destination, and,
o Ensure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to the
level required by all protection authorities indicated on the
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datagram.
The DoD Basic Security Option is currently implemented in a number of
operating systems (e.g., [IRIX2008], [SELinux2008], [Solaris2008],
and [Cisco2008]), and deployed in a number of high-security networks.
These networks are typically either in physically secure locations,
protected by military/governmental communications security equipment,
or both. Such networks are typically built using commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) IP routers and Ethernet switches, but are not normally
interconnected with the global public Internet. This option probably
has more deployment now than when the IESG removed this option from
the IETF standards-track. [RFC5570] describes a similar option
recently defined for IPv6 and has much more detailed explanations of
how sensitivity label options are used in real-world deployments.
4.12.2. Option specification
It is specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108] (which obsoletes RFC 1038
[RFC1038]).
RFC 791 [RFC0791] defined the "Security Option" (Type = 130),
which used the same option type as the DoD Basic Security option
discussed in this section. The "Security Option" specified in RFC
791 is considered obsolete by Section 3.2.1.8 of RFC 1122, and
therefore the discussion in this section is focused on the DoD
Basic Security option specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108].
Section 4.2.2.1 of RFC 1812 states that routers "SHOULD implement
this option".
[IOS-12.2][RFC4949][RFC3585][RFC4807]
4.12.3. Threats
Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any
specific new threat (other than the usual generic issues that might
be created if packets with options are forwarded via the "slow
path"). Packets with this option ought not normally be seen on the
global public Internet.
4.12.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped
from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then
the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it
isn't properly labelled. In some cases, the receiver might receive
the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the
received data from the packet whose IPSO BSO was stripped by an
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intermediate router or firewall. Associating an incorrect
sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be
handled as more sensitive than it really is ("upgrading") or as less
sensitive than it really is ("downgrading"), either of which is
problematic.
4.12.5. Advice
Routers and firewalls ought not by default drop packets containing
IPSO and also ought not by default strip the IPSO from the packet.
For auditing reasons, routers and firewalls SHOULD be capable of
logging the numbers of packets containing the IPSO BSO on a per-
interface basis. Also, routers and firewalls SHOULD be capable of
filtering packets based on the IPSO BSO presence as well as the IPSO
BSO values.
4.13. DoD Extended Security Option (Type = 133)
4.13.1. Uses
This option permits additional security labeling information, beyond
that present in the Basic Security Option (Section 4.12), to be
supplied in an IP datagram to meet the needs of registered
authorities.
4.13.2. Option specification
This option is specified by RFC 1108 [RFC1108].
[IOS-12.2][RFC4949][RFC3585][RFC4807]
4.13.3. Threats
Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any
specific new threat (other than the usual generic issues that might
be created if packets with options are forwarded via the "slow
path"). Packets with this option ought not normally be seen on the
global public Internet
4.13.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped
from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then
the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it
isn't properly labelled. In some cases, the receiver might receive
the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the
received data from the packet whose IPSO BSO was stripped by an
intermediate router or firewall. Associating an incorrect
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sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be
handled as more sensitive than it really is ("upgrading") or as less
sensitive than it really is ("downgrading"), either of which is
problematic.
4.13.5. Advice
Routers and firewalls ought not by default drop packets containing
IPSO and also ought not by default strip the IPSO from the packet.
For auditing reasons, routers and firewalls SHOULD be capable of
logging the numbers of packets containing the IPSO BSO on a per-
interface basis. Also, routers and firewalls SHOULD be capable of
filtering packets based on the IPSO BSO presence as well as the IPSO
BSO values.
4.14. Commercial IP Security Option (CIPSO) (Type = 134)
4.14.1. Uses
This option was proposed by the Trusted Systems Interoperability
Group (TSIG), with the intent of meeting trusted networking
requirements for the commercial trusted systems market place.
It is currently implemented in a number of operating systems (e.g.,
IRIX [IRIX2008], Security-Enhanced Linux [SELinux2008], and Solaris
[Solaris2008]), and deployed in a number of high-security networks.
4.14.2. Option specification
This option is specified in [CIPSO1992] and [FIPS1994]. There are
zero known IP router implementations of CIPSO. Several MLS operating
systems support CIPSO, generally the same MLS operating systems that
support IPSO.
4.14.3. Threats
Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any
specific new threat (other than the usual generic issues that might
be created if packets with options are forwarded via the "slow
path"). Packets with this option ought not normally be seen on the
global public Internet.
4.14.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped
from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then
the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it
isn't properly labelled. In some cases, the receiver might receive
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the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the
received data from the packet whose IPSO BSO was stripped by an
intermediate router or firewall. Associating an incorrect
sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be
handled as more sensitive than it really is ("upgrading") or as less
sensitive than it really is ("downgrading"), either of which is
problematic.
4.14.5. Advice
Because of the design of this option, with variable syntax and
variable length, it is not practical to support specialised filtering
using the CIPSO information. No routers or firewalls are known to
support this option. However, by default a router or firewall should
not modify or remove this option from IP packets and a router or
firewall should not by default drop packets containing this option.
4.15. Sender Directed Multi-Destination Delivery (Type = 149)
4.15.1. Uses
This option originally provided unreliable UDP delivery to a set of
addresses included in the option. It is currently obsolete.
4.15.2. Option specification
This option is defined in RFC 1770 [RFC1770].
4.15.3. Threats
This option could have been exploited for bandwidth-amplification in
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
4.15.4. Operational/interoperability impact if blocked
None.
4.15.5. Advice
Filter IP packets that contain a Sender Directed Multi-Destination
Delivery option.
5. Security Considerations