(NOTE: this is just a placeholder for discussions around the feasibility of these ideas atop telehash)
While telehash provides a distributed mesh, it doesn't inherently protect the physical network identity of any node using it. A hashname is intrinsically identified by and associated with it's one or more current network addresses (usually IP).
ORT is a method for overlaying a privacy routing service atop telehash such that a sender and recipient cannot discover each others current network address, similar to the functionality in services like Tor and I2P but only within telehash, not for anonymizing general Internet connectivity.
Routing:
- use the same kademlia distance pattern to create a secondary DHT of just ORT nodes
- any sender or recipient must establish an initial "branch" location on the DHT
- everyone creates one or more "traces" between it and a branch
- packets only contain a next-hop, that hop must have had a trace created to translate it
- senders and recipients may both create multiple traces, each trace increases privacy
Network Capacity:
- the ORT cloud is always running at 100% capacity
- packets w/o a trace are randomly forwarded (noise, to fill capacity)
- new/real content must be swapped out for random packets
- force stable nodes to receive more in order to utilize capacity
Content Packets:
- is a
linealternative/wrapper (switches process normally after validating/deciphering) - must allways be exactly 1k