| status | flip | authors | sponsors | updated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
imlemented |
196 |
Deniz Mert Edincik ([email protected]) |
Bastian Mueller ([email protected]) |
2023-10-24 |
With the new controller-based capability API, introduced in FLIP 798, it is possible to re-publish someone else's capability (with Account.capabilities.publish).
This was not possible in the previous/currently available linking-based capability API, the function AuthAccount.link does not allow targeting another account.
As this shift in behavior can cause problems, this FLIP strives to address this issue with minimal disruption.
Before the introduction of the new controller-based capabilities API, public capabilities were guaranteed to point to storage at the same address. However, with the introduction of the API, it is now possible to obtain another account's public capability and republish it as one's own, while still maintaining the link to the other account's storage.
A lot of scenarios, such as voting and gating using the proof of Non-Fungible Token (NFT) ownership, usually involve checking if an account owns a certain balance or resource by verifying the public path capability. Now, the responsibility of protection falls on the developers, which is an extra burden and holds the potential of introducing bugs and security issues.
The current suggested method of defence against this issue is always checking for the address of the capability or the owner of the resource after borrowing.
Unfortunately, this is an error-prone approach that developers can easily forget.
In addition, the new capabilities.borrow convenience function gets the capability and borrows it in one call.
Developers will likely forget to still get and check the address of the capability, when needed.
This proposal aims to add a restriction, in order to decrease developer burden and decrease the risk of bugs and security issues. The restriction already exists in the currently available linking-based capability API, so this proposal simply proposes to keep the existing restriction, and prevent a regression in the API in terms of safety and usability.
I suggest adding a restriction to the capability API, permitting only capabilities from the same account address to be published via capabilities.publish.
There may be existing capabilities that use the new API to access other accounts' storage, however I don't believe this will be a significant issue, given its relative newness.
I don't think there will be any performance implications.
There is already a Draft PR implementation by Bastian (onflow/cadence#2782)
As this is an additional restriction, it is backwards compatible with the API.